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FORECLOSING ON FAME: 
EXPLORING THE UNCHARTED 
BOUNDARIES OF THE RIGHT 
OF PUBLICITY 
MELISSA B. JACOBY* & DIANE LEENHEER ZIMMERMAN** 
Since the 1950s in the United States, fame increasingly has been treated as a com­
modity rather than a purely personal attribute. States, encouraged largely by enter­
tainers, sports figures, and their families, have created a new form of intellectual 
property interest called the right of publicity, a right to exploit one's identity for 
commercial purposes. This right permits famous people-and increasingly their 
heirs and legatees-to control how, and demand payment when, their names and 
faces are used by others. Moreover, the right is freely alienable, meaning that it can 
be transferred to third parties in whole or in part. Most of the scholarship examin­
ing this form of intellectual property has concentrated on the justifications for giv­
ing famous people this kind of control over, and right to profit from, the 
commercial use of their identities, or on the First Amendment ramifications of the 
interest. In other words, the scholarship has focused on the pros and cons of creat­
ing a property interest that advantages a celebrity, her heirs, and assigns. But the 
legal assignment of property status to an interest can, under some circumstances, 
decrease, rather than increase, the control that the "owner" has over the valued 
asset. That darker side of the equation has received almost no attention either in the 
literature or in the case law dealing with publicity. In this Article, we examine the 
right of publicity as an asset in the context of the debtor-creditor system. Whereas 
personal rights in one's privacy or reputation are generally unavailable for creditor 
seizure and sale, the transformation of the persona into a commodity logically 
should make it vulnerable to seizure by an unsatisfied creditor, permitting control 
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over how the right is exploited to be transferred by sale to the highest bidder. The 
right of publicity presents some complexities in the debtor-creditor context because 
the property interest in some cases may need to be disentangled from its residual 
overlay of personal rights, and because the use of property to satisfy a creditor's 
claims must be handled in a way that respects the debtor's right to the benefits of 
her future labor. Our examination of the issues leads us to conclude that the com­
plexities presented by treating publicity rights as property in the debtor-creditor 
context are resolvable and indeed are similar to those presented by other types of 
property that are currently recognized as such in the debtor-creditor system and 
used to satisfy unpaid debts; the complexities do not militate against treating the 
right of publicity as an asset in the debtor-creditor system. 
INTRODUCTION 
Let us imagine that, although basketball legend Michael Jordan 
owns a lot of property, he has many debts and has not been paying 
them. Let us further imagine that one of his creditors is the young 
golf legend Tiger Woods. If Woods fails to convince Jordan to pay 
back what he owes through informal means, state law would permit 
Woods to file a lawsuit and obtain a judgment against him.1 Judgment 
in hand, Woods could send the local sheriff to levy on Jordan's prop­
erty.2 In essence, Jordan's failure to pay his debts would give Woods 
the power to haul off most of Jordan's personal property in a wheel­
barrow for sale to the highest bidder.3 Once Jordan's assets were auc­
tioned off, the proceeds would then be used to satisfy the debt that 
Jordan owed, but failed to pay, to Woods. 
This brief hypothetical captures the essence of the debtor-credi­
tor system: If you do not pay your debts, you are at risk of losing your 
property. All across the various sectors of the debtor-creditor system, 
the outcome is roughly similar. A chapter 7 bankruptcy filing, 
whether initiated voluntarily by the debtor4 or involuntarily by her 
1 In fact, if Jordan gave Woods a security interest in his property at the time of the 
loan, Woods could seize Jordan's property once Jordan defaulted on his obligations and 
ultimately could dispose of it without court involvement. See U.C.C. § 9-609 (2000) (au­
thorizing secured party to take possession of collateral after default, without judicial pro­
cess, if it proceeds without breach of peace); see id. § 9-610 (authorizing commercially 
reasonable disposition). 
2 See generally Lynn M. LoPucki & Elizabeth Warren, Secured Credit: A Systems 
Approach 5-20 (3d ed. 2000) (describing unsecured creditors' rights and debt collection 
process). 
3 See Lawrence P. King & Michael L. Cook, Creditors' Rights, Debtors' Protection 
and Bankruptcy 79-81 (3d ed. 1997) ( explaining that state law determines what property of 
debtor may be seized for satisfaction of judgment, but generally includes everything in 
which debtor has property interest). 
4 See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2001) (authorizing commencement of voluntary bankruptcy 
case). 
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creditors,5 requires that the debtor's assets be marshalled and sold to 
satisfy her obligations. So, too, the Internal Revenue Service has ex­
pansive powers to seize and sell property to satisfy unpaid debt.6 
Most people who contemplate the consequences of their unpaid 
debt have some awareness of the risk that they might lose their houses 
and other tangible possessions. But suppose, in the hypothetical dis­
pute between Woods and Jordan, Jordan's most valuable property­
and hence the most desirable target for creditors-is not his real es­
tate or other tangible goods, but his ability to exploit his fame com­
mercially. Does his "celebrity" go into the "wheelbarrow" of assets 
along with his cars and his yachts? 
One might be inclined to respond, "But fame isn't property; it's 
identity." That instinct, however understandable, actually would be 
out of step with the current legal reality.7 Over the last fifty years, 
state law increasingly has come to treat the ability to profit from the 
commercialization of one's persona less as a privacy interest and more 
as a kind of property interest, fully alienable,8 and, in many jurisdic­
tions, descendible as well.9 Called a "right of publicity," it permits 
licensing and transfers, and violation of the right is remediable by a 
combination of injunctive relief and damages.10 This shift in state law 
has benefitted celebrities particularly by allowing them to control 
more aggressively, and mine the value of, their images and other as­
pects of their identities.11 
5 See § 303 (authorizing creditors to file involuntary bankruptcy case against debtor, 
subject to certain restrictions). 
6 See 26 U.S.C. § 6331{a) (2001). 
7 By some estimates, more than half the jurisdictions in the United States now recog­
nize a property right in the commercial exploitation of an individual's persona. See infra 
note 82. 
8 See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 32-36-1-16 (West 2002) (making publicity rights assigna­
ble); Nev. Rev. Stat. 597.800(1) (2001) (same); Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. 
Change v. Am. Heritage Prods., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982) (same); Nature's Way Prods., 
Inc. v. Nature-Pharma, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 245, 252 (D. Utah 1990) (same); Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 cmt. g (1995) ("The interest in the commercial value of 
a person's identity is in the nature of a property right and is freely assignable to others."). 
9 Oklahoma law, for example, describes publicity rights in the following way: 
The rights recognized under this section are property rights, freely transfera­
ble, in whole or in part, by contract or by means of trust or testamentary docu­
ments, whether the transfer occurs before the death of the deceased 
personality, by the deceased personality or his or her transferees, or, after the 
death of the deceased personality, by the person or persons in whom such 
rights vest under this section or the transferees of that person or persons. 
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1448(B) (West 2002). 
10 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 48-49 (stating that injunc­
tive relief and damages are typically available for violations of rights of publicity). 
11 For examples of recent, expansive statutory definitions of the publicity right, see,
e.g., Ind. Code Ann.§ 32-36-1-8 (West 2002); Okla. Stat. tit. 12 (West 2002). For examples
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But because the debtor-creditor system has not taken note of this 
developing property interest in one's persona, it has been blind to the 
many millions of dollars worth of publicity rights that have passed 
through the system. A casual search turned up dozens of people with 
valuable personas who have filed for bankruptcy in recent years, in­
cluding Burt Reynolds,12 Gary Coleman,13 Gary Burghoff (Radar on 
M*A':'S*H),14 Debbie Reynolds,15 Ron Isley (of Isley Brothers 
fame),16 Mickey Rooney,17 Meat Loaf,18 Wayne Newton,19 Isaac 
Hayes,20 Tom Petty,21 Tammy Wynette,22 Peter Bogdanovich,23 Melba 
Moore,24 Luther Campbell ( of Two Live Crew),25 Tia Carrere,26 M.C. 
Hammer (now just "Hammer"),27 Kim Basinger,28 Lynn Redgrave,29 
of cases where celebrities, their heirs, and assigns are expanding the margins of what con­
stitutes an actionable commercial use of a celebrity persona, see Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 
125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing actors' rights to sue to prevent robotic represen­
tations of fictional characters where actors are identified with characters); Comedy III 
Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) (involving holders of rights of 
deceased actors known as "Three Stooges" who objected to lithographic reproductions of 
drawing of them used for posters and T-shirts). 
12 See Belinda Luscombe, People, Tune, Dec. 16, 1996, at 87. 
13 See Former Child Star Coleman Files for Personal Bankruptcy, Chi. Trib., Aug. 19, 
1999, at C2. 
14 See 'Radar' Gets His Fmancial Bearings Again, Times-Picayune (New Orleans),
Aug. 1, 1999, at A25. 
15 See Nancy Rivera Brooks, Debbie Reynolds, Hotel in Chapter 11, L.A. Times, July 
8, 1998, at Dl. 
16 Interestingly, in Isley's bankruptcy, his rights to his songs, which were to be included 
in a comprehensive sale of his assets, were the subject of a bidding war between a sympa­
thetic and hostile bidder. See Paul Farhi, Settling an Old Score?; Singer Michael Bolton 
Lost a Plagiarism Fight, But He Could Wm R&B Legend Ronald Isley's Fortune, Wash. 
Post, Feb. 22, 2000, at Cl; Paul Farhi, No Isley Estate for Michael Bolton, Wash. Post, Feb. 
24, 2000, at C12 (reporting that lower bid for assets was approved by court). 
17 See Belinda Luscombe, People, Tune, July 22, 1996, at 101. 
18 See Mike Joyce, Meat Loaf, Out of Hell, Wash. Post, May 20, 1994, at N17.
19 See Associated Press, Wayne Newton Ftles Under Bankruptcy Law, Chi. Trib., Aug. 
18, 1992, at C4. 
20 See From Shaft to Chef, Newsweek, Mar. 23, 1998, at 60. 
21 See Robert Palmer, The Pop Life; Tom Petty: Ready to Fight the Good Fight, N.Y. 
Times, May 6, 1981, at C25. 
22 See Mike Boehm, Steel Magnolia; Resilience, Not Heartache, Is the Real Root of 
Tammy Wynette's Success, L.A. Tunes, Jan. 17, 1991, at 4. 
23 See David Crook, Bogdanovich's Bankrupt Memorial, L.A. Times, Dec. 19, 1985, 
Part 6, at 1. 
24 See Katy Kelly, Melba Moore Has Wolves at the Door, USA Today, Dec. 14, 1993, at
2D. 
25 See Luther Campbell Files for Bankruptcy Protection, Sun-Sentinel (Fort Lauder­
dale), June 14, 1995, at 2A. 
26 See James Grant, Her Hospital Role in Remission, Tia Carrere Cries A-Team or
Bust, People, Apr. 28, 1996, at 116. 
27 See Benjamin Pimentel, Rap Star's Bankruptcy Troubles; MC Hammer Accused of
Not Declaring Some Assets to Trustee, S.F. Chron., July 1, 1999, at A18. 
28 See Gioia Bellafante, People, Time, June 7, 1993, at 73. 
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Zsa Zsa Gabor,30 Jerry Lewis,31 Jerry Lee Lewis,32 Toni Braxton,33 
Lorraine Bracco,34 Francis Ford Coppola,35 baseball players Tony 
Gwynn36 and Jack Clark,37 and football players Harvey Martin,38 Rich 
Upchurch,39 and Bruce Clark.40 In addition to those from the sports 
and entertainment industry, other prominent figures who have de­
clared bankruptcy include former governors John Connally41 and Fife 
Symington.42 
The celebrities, and the courts and legislators that have re­
sponded to their pleas by creating ever more expansive publicity 
rights, most likely never considered the possibility that these rights 
might be subject to the demands of unpaid creditors.43 In this Article, 
however, we explore the suggestion that, once the individual persona 
is transformed from something purely personal into a fully alienable 
commodity, these publicity rights should be just as susceptible to 
forced sale in the debtor-creditor system as cars, boats, or busi­
nesses. 44 We begin with a brief history of the development of the right 
of publicity and look at some differences in applicable state law that 
may affect whether and in what form a publicity right can be said to 
exist. We then tum to the debtor-creditor system and focus particu-
29 See Thomas D. Elias, Redgrave Can't Pay Lawyers, Files for Bankruptcy, Star Trib. 
(Minneapolis), June 1, 1994, at 6E. 
30 See Zsa Zsa Gabor Files for Bankruptcy in L.A., Chi. Trib., Mar. 18, 1994, at C2. 
31 See Jerry Lewis Settles Suit, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1981, § 1, at 67. 
32 See Kim Clark, Why So Many Americans Are Going Bankrupt, Fortune, Aug. 4, 
1997, at 24, 25. 
33 See Joy Bennett Kinnon, The Rise and Fall and Rise of Toni Braxton, Ebony, Dec. 
2000, at 165. 
34 See David Cobb Craig, Passages, People, June 28, 1999, at 83 Split the Pie, N.Y. Post, 
Oct. 2, 1999, at 8. 
35 See Hal Foster, $289 Million in Debts: Coppola Files for Bankruptcy, S.F. Chron., 
Jan. 26, 1990, at A2. 
36 See Tom Friend, San Diego's Gwynn Files for Bankruptcy, L.A. Times, May 24, 
1987, § 3, at 10. 
37 See Bankruptcy Is Seen as Fresh Start by Clark, Com. Appeal (Memphis), Aug. 9, 
1992, at D2. 
38 See Another Strike Casualty, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1982, at B9. 
39 Id. 
40 Steve Liesman & Jon Wilson, NFL Riches: It's Easy Come Easy Go; Players Get 
Ripped off All Too Often, Star Trib. (Minneapolis), May 10, 1992, at 12C. 
41 See John Connally Files for Bankruptcy, Chi. Trib., Aug. 1, 1987, at 6C. 
42 See Pat Flannery, Governor Files Bankruptcy; Symington's Assets to Be Liquidated 
to Pay Off Creditors, Phoenix Gazette, Sept. 20, 1995, at Al. 
43 But see 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1075/15 (West 2001) (exempting publicity rights, but not 
income earned from exploiting them, from levy or attachment by creditors). To the best of 
the authors' knowledge, the Illinois exemption is unique. 
44 Cf. Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1283, 
1295-96 (2000) ("If we don't intend the item to be transferred, then we needn't treat it as 
property at all."). 
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larly on how publicity rights might be treated in a chapter 7 federal 
bankruptcy case. 
In addition to such basic legal questions as whether publicity 
rights fit into the definition of a debtor's "property" for bankruptcy 
purposes, we also consider larger questions raised by involuntary di­
vestiture of this form of wealth. We examine whether it is appropriate 
to expose an asset of this sort to the full set of consequences that re­
sult from involvement in the debtor-creditor system, and we ulti­
mately conclude that it is. Publicity rights retain intensely personal 
associations and are closely tied to the personal efforts and labor of 
the celebrity, but the debtor-creditor system gives little weight to the 
importance that personal control may have for debtors in relation to 
privately owned property generally. On examination, it is unclear 
why that concern should be weighed differently in the case of publicity 
rights. Although the debtor may be dismayed by the prospect that her 
publicity rights will be transferred to the highest bidder (who may be a 
stranger and whose intentions may be at odds with those of the debtor 
celebrity), this outcome is consistent with the loss of control over 
property interests inherent in the debtor-creditor system. Further­
more, as we will explain, the impact is not as dire as it might first 
appear. Accounting for publicity rights as an asset in the debtor-cred­
itor system need neither deprive the celebrity of the benefit of her 
future labor nor unreasonably interfere with her reputational and 
other dignitary interests in how her persona is used by others. 
We do not suggest that recognizing publicity rights in this way will 
be a problem-free endeavor, and we acknowledge that the result likely 
will be undesirable from the perspective of a celebrity debtor, whose 
interests largely have controlled the development of publicity rights 
thus far. But, on balance, we conclude that if publicity rights are go­
ing to be treated as property interests outside of the debtor-creditor 
system, it seems appropriate to treat them similarly in the debtor­
creditor system. 
One piece of support for this position comes from the fact that 
advocates of a substantial overhaul of American personal bankruptcy 
law often have used celebrity bankruptcies as examples of the injus­
tice in the current system. They argue that reform is needed to pre­
vent rich and famous people from using the bankruptcy system to 
discharge their debts in bankruptcy while at the same time not liqui­
dating their assets or substantially repaying their creditors.45 This ar-
45 See Greg Miller, Senate OKs Strict Law on Bankruptcy, L.A. Tunes, Mar. 16, 2001, 
at 1; Katharine Q. Seelye, Bankruptcies by Musicians Inspire a Bill, N.Y. Times, May 15, 
1998, at AlS. 
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gument might have less force if celebrities' publicity rights were 
characterized as property within the debtor-creditor system, requiring 
debtors either to liquidate them or to pay for the right to retain them. 
I 
PUBLICITY RIGHTS: How THEY ORIGINATED, WHAT THEY ARE, 
AND OTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THEM OF RELEVANCE TO THE 
DEBTOR-CREDITOR SYSTEM 
A. How They Originated and What They Are
Publicity rights are creatures of state law. The interest is con­
ceived of as a classic property right in that it can be alienated, li­
censed, and in many states, passed on to one's descendants by will or 
intestate succession.46 The property right inheres in a cluster of char­
acteristics that evoke recognition of a natural person when they are 
either used directly or are imitated. 47 Whoever owns this cluster of
characteristics-be it an individual or a corporation-has control over 
all commercial uses of that persona.48 
The right of publicity had its origins in a body of tort law that was 
designed to protect personal privacy. In the early twentieth century, 
courts began to recognize a cause of action for the invasion of several 
clusters of personal interests loosely grouped under the privacy ru­
bric.49 One of the most widely recognized of these interests prevented
46 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
47 See generally J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy (2d ed.
2001); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and 
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 291 (1983). 
48 The definition of a commercial use is currently the subject of much disagreement, as
will be discussed at greater length, infra Part I.B.1. It certainly includes uses in advertise­
ments, and is often said to apply to uses on goods intended for sale. See, e.g., Comedy III 
Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) (considering unauthorized litho­
graph of "The Three Stooges" on T-shirts and posters commercial use); Lugosi v. Universal 
Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979) (recognizing depictions of Bela Lugosi as Dracula on T­
shirts, card games, candy dispensers, and other merchandise as commercial use). The ex­
tent to which uses for purposes other than advertising can legitimately be termed "com­
mercial" and hence fall within the celebrity's property interest is currently the subject of 
much litigation. Although the California Supreme Court in Saderup continued to apply a 
fairly broad definition of "commercial," other courts have begun to cut back. See, e.g., 
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir. 1996) 
( denying that use of identity on baseball trading cards is "commercial" use). Although the 
cards in Cardtoons were clearly parodies, the court did not limit its analysis to parody, but 
rather stated that trading cards in general are informational rather than commercial works. 
Id. at 969-70. 
49 These interests ultimately were sorted out and classified by Dean William Prosser. 
Dean Prosser pointed out that, in addition to a protection against unwanted commerciali­
zation of one's persona-the relevant interest for this paper-the privacy tort also included 
a right to be protected against intrusions into one's seclusion, against the publication of 
embarrassing private information, and against publication of false information about the 
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the use without consent of a person's name or image for "commercial" 
purposes. Plaintiffs whose identities were appropriated improperly 
for such purposes were typically awarded injunctive relief, although 
they also could obtain damages for dignitary harm (usually couched as 
an award for emotional distress).50 The vast majority of cases in­
volved the use of a name or face in advertising or in purported testi­
monials for products and services.51 Because privacy rights were 
personal, no one other than the individual whose identity was appro­
priated could sue, and the right expired at the time of the individual's 
death.52 An undercurrent of embarrassment attended the tort when 
celebrities invoked it, however, because it was conceptually difficult to 
understand how further commercialization could harm the privacy of 
someone who already earned his bread by exploiting his fame volun­
tarily in just this fashion. 
The law on unconsented commercialization underwent a radical 
transformation in 1953 when Judge Jerome Frank decided a dispute 
between two producers of baseball trading cards.53 A player had en­
tered into an agreement giving the plaintiff the exclusive right to use 
his face on its cards. Later, however, the player entered into a similar 
agreement with the defendant. The defendant argued that the plain­
tiff was not entitled to exclusivity under its agreement with the base­
ball player because, as a legal matter, the contract simply was a 
release from liability for invasion of privacy.54 Judge Frank disagreed. 
He concluded that the agreement was not a release, but rather a trans­
fer of a valuable economic interest generated by the ballplayer's status 
as a celebrity.55 At least among people who trade on their fame, said 
the judge, a commercial use of the individual's persona without con-
individual (the so-called false light tort). William Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 
(1960). The origins of the privacy tort can be traced largely to Warren and Brandeis's 
influential article addressing the necessity of creating a cause of action to protect privacy. 
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890); 
see also Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 74 (Ga. 1905); Zimmerman, 
supra note 47 at 295. 
so For examples of courts issuing injunctive relief, see Onassis v. Christian Dior, 472 
N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1984); Brinkley v. Casablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (App. Div. 
1981). For cases resulting in monetary damages, see, e.g., Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. 
Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533, 545-47 (W.D. Tex. 1980); Genesis Publ'ns, Inc. v. Goss, 
437 So. 2d 169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
51 See, e.g., Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 68 (involving use of plaintiff's name and face in 
fabricated testimonial for insurance company). 
52 See, e.g., Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 
382 U.S. 833 (1965) (holding that posthumous telecasts concerning Al Capone did not in­
vade privacy of offspring, relatives, or friends not mentioned therein). 
53 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Che\ving Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
54 Id. at 867. 
55 Id. at 868. 
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sent is not an invasion of his privacy, but rather an appropriation of a 
valuable asset for which the celebrity must be compensated.56 And 
when a celebrity grants exclusive rights in his persona to someone 
else, what has occurred is the transfer of this property. The assignee 
thereafter has the power to exclude rivals from making competing 
uses. 
Judge Frank did not focus on the normative justifications for 
treating this "asset" as formal property, but subsequent commentators 
and courts have supplied a variety of such justifications. Most start 
from the premise that celebrities "create" their valuable personas in 
much the same way that a novelist creates a work of fiction or an 
inventor a new device. Thus, giving the famous individual a property 
right in this form of intellectual property has been explained as an 
incentive to promote future creativity, as a reward for a valuable ser­
vice to the public, or as a means of preventing unjust enrichment.57
Following the Haelan decision, courts-and more recently legisla­
tures-in many states have followed Judge Frank's lead by breaking 
so-called publicity rights free of their roots in privacy and treating 
them instead as a kind of intellectual property, alienable in whole or 
in part by license, sale, or assignment.58 
The recognition of this property right has contributed to a bur­
geoning "market" for fame. Since 1953, trading in identity has be­
come big business. The two famous figures in the hypothetical that 
began this article are, as it turns out, excellent examples of how profit­
able it can be to exploit a persona affirmatively. Tiger Woods is pri­
marily a professional golfer and clearly is well-compensated for his 
performance on the golf course. But he reportedly earned an addi­
tional fifty to sixty million dollars in 2000 alone by licensing out the 
use of his face and his name to companies that want to use them to 
promote products.59 He has a contract with Nike, for example, to Ii-
56 Judge Frank highlighted the irony in requiring celebrities who wanted publicity but 
wanted compensation as well to try to bring their complaint under the common law of 
privacy-the only body of law that seemed available. See id. 
57 The various justifications for the recognition of publicity rights are set out in Michael 
Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 Cal. 
L. Rev. 127, 178-215 (1993); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights into
Intellectual Property and Free Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants Too Long!, 10 
DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. & Pol'y 283, 304-13 (2000).
58 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. The distinction between privacy and
publicity interests are detailed in Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial 
Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1199, 1203-15 
(1986). 
59 See Grainger David, Tiger Woods, Fortune, Apr. 30, 2001, at 25; Dave Anderson, 
Big Money, a Broken Bat and a Wonder Named Woods, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2000, § 8, at 
1; 2000: The Year in Review, People, Advertising Age, Dec. 18, 2000, at 38. 
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cense sports gear and merchandise, like posters of Woods, to his fans 
and admirers.60 Woods, in fact, has set up a corporation, ETW, for 
the sole purpose of managing his publicity rights. 61 Michael Jordan, 
before his last "retirement" from professional basketball, was re­
ported to have earned forty million dollars in a single year by allowing 
his name to be used in connection with sneakers, underwear, and tele­
phone service. 62 
A further indication of the value of fame as a commodity can be 
gleaned from the efforts in recent years by famous people to securitize 
the value of their identities. Singer David Bowie started the trend in 
1997 when he floated fifty-five million dollars in bonds backed by fu­
ture income from his music and recordings.63 As one commentator 
noted, ownership of intellectual property alone was not enough to 
make this sort of bond successful; in addition, the issuer had to be a 
"superstar."64 Since then, other celebrities have come even closer 
than Bowie in marketing what approaches "pure" fame, as distin­
guished from any other pre-existing intellectual property interests. 
Baseball player Frank Thomas securitized his future career with the 
Chicago White Sox in 1998, seeking to raise a reported twenty million 
dollars.65 Rap singer Sean "Puffy" Combs (once commonly known as 
Puff Daddy and now as P. Diddy) made plans to cash in on his fame 
and that of other African-American entertainers through an initial 
public offering in a company that would sell merchandise endorsed by 
60 Woods recently signed a contract with Nike worth $100 million. See Mark Hyman, 
The Yin and Yang of the Tiger Effect, Business Week, Oct. 16, 2000, at 110. 
61 ETW Corp. registered the trademark "TIGER WOO DS" "for art prints, calendars, 
mounted photographs, notebooks, pencils, pens, posters, trading cards, and unmounted 
photographs .. .. " ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d. 829, 830 (N.D. 
Ohio 2000). 
62 Associated Press, Jordan Wants Out of Endorsements, Columbian (Vancouver, WA), 
Mar. 23, 2000, at C4 (reporting Jordan's endorsement income for 1997). Woods and Jordan 
may be particularly successful in capitalizing on their fame, but they are not unique among 
successful sports figures. In 1993, tennis stars Andre Agassi and Monica Seles earned 
about seven million dollars a piece for licensing their publicity rights. John J. Coneys, Jr., 
To Tax or Not To Tax: Is a Non-Resident Tennis Player's Endorsement Income Subject to 
Taxation in the United States?, 9 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 885,886 & nn.6 
& 7 (1999). 
63 See Russ Wiles, Unglamorous Asset-Backed Securities Outdo Glitzy Cousins, Ariz. 
Republic, Feb. 14, 1999, available at 1999 WL 12746494. For a description of Bowie's 
securitization process, see Corey Field, Their Master's Voice? Recording Artists, Bright 
Lines, and Bowie Bonds: The Debate over Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire, 48 
J. Copyright Soc. 145, 184-88 (2000).
64 Id. at 187. Clearly only part of the value of what Bowie securitized was the worth of
his recordings and songs. The rest comes from his popularity as a performer and the inter­
est the public has in him as a personality. 
65 Lisa Tibbits, Hambro Hits Homer with ABS Deal for Chisox All-Star, Investment 
Dealers' Dig., Apr. 20, 1998, at 6, 6-7. 
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them.66 The idea was derailed, at least temporarily, by Mr. Combs's 
highly publicized brush with the criminal justice system.67 Neverthe­
less, Mr. Combs continues to own and promote a brand of sportswear 
that was expected to generate $200 million in sales in 2001.68 
A final indication of the worth to celebrities of their publicity 
rights is the size of the compensatory awards that they receive when 
defendants are found to have misappropriated this intellectual prop­
erty. A federal district court recently concluded that using actor 
Dustin Hoffman's image once as a "commercial" model in a news 
magazine was worth $1.5 million.69 The Beatles, whose act was imi­
tated in the show Beatlemania, were awarded close to eight million 
dollars in 1986 for the use of their respective personas in the offending 
production.70 And, more than a decade ago, Bette Midler won 
$400,000 in compensation for the offense of having her voice imitated 
by someone else in a commercial.71 Clearly, as these examples show, 
the property interest introduced by the Haelan decision is not trivial, 
either to the celebrities, or in absolute terms. 
B. Defining the Property at Issue
A court or creditor interested in liquidating a publicity right must 
know something about the laws that define ( and in some instances, 
fail to define) it. It will be important to know if the right exists at all, 
and it may be useful to understand the scope of what can be sold, in 
order, for example, to decide whether the asset is likely to have signif­
icant market value. Not all states clearly recognize publicity rights, 
and those that do vary in what these rights protect. Also, because 
enforcement of the exclusive property right in the use of a celebrity 
identity can implicate the speech rights of others, awareness of recog­
nized and evolving First Amendment limitations on the right of pub­
licity is also helpful. What follows, therefore, is a brief review of 
66 See Rosemarie Maldonado, Celeb IPOs: Names Only Go So Far: Beyond the Glitz, 
Business Fundamentals Still Rule, Investment News, Jan. 24, 2000, available at 2000 WL 
9429795. 
67 See id. 
68 The sportswear line is called Sean John. Guy Trebay, Fashion Statement: Hip-Hop 
on Runway, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 2002, at Al. Combs appears in all the print advertise­
ments for it. Polly Devaney, Celebrities Vie for a Part of the Own-Brand Market, Market­
ing Wk., July 19, 2001, at 28. 
69 Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867 (C.D. Cal. 1999), rev'd on 
other grounds, 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001). The lower court also awarded Hoffman puni­
tive damages in the amount of $1.5 million. Hoffman lost, however, on appeal when the 
court concluded that the defendants had a First Amendment defense available to them. 
70 See Apple Corps. Ltd. v. Leber, 229 U.S.P.Q. 1015, 1016 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986). 
71 Midler v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., Nos. 90-55027, 90-55028, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. 
Sept. 20, 1991). 
November 2002] FORECLOSING ON FAME 1333 
issues in publicity law that may have particular relevance to the 
debtor-creditor system. 
1. Publicity Rights Are Subject to Limits Imposed by the First
Amendment of the Constitution
The right of publicity is limited by the First Amendment of the
federal Constitution largely to uses that are deemed "commercial "; it 
cannot be used to limit newsworthy publications.72 There remains, 
however, considerable disagreement over where the line between 
commercial and protected uses falls.73 Most would agree that the 
property interest can extend to the use of personal characteristics in 
advertising74 or in promotions designed to sell goods and services. 
But many other, more controversial types of uses also have been vari­
ously labeled "commercial." 75 For example, owners of publicity rights 
often claim the right to control depictions on posters and other 
memorabilia76 and in shows and performances based on imitations of 
famous people.77 California, by statute, extends the property right to 
uses of a celebrity's identity in what is frankly recognized as editorial 
content if the use is "so directly connected with a product, article of 
merchandise, good, or service as to constitute an act of advertising, 
selling, or soliciting purchases .... "78 This provision appears to re­
quire writers and editors to obtain licenses to use celebrity identities 
72 There was one notable exception to this otherwise standard distinction. In the only 
U.S. Supreme Court case ever to deal with publicity rights, the Court said that a state was 
free to compensate a performer whose entire act-in this case, a fifteen-second flight out 
of a cannon and into a net-was used without permission as part of a newscast. Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-76 (1977). The videotape of Zacchini, 
known as "the human cannonball," was shown on a news broadcast as part of the coverage 
of a local fair. The Court was concerned that permitting a broadcaster to present an entire 
event as "news" would deprive performers of the ability to draw paying audiences, thereby 
damaging their incentives to provide the performance at issue. 
73 For discussion of this problem, see Zimmerman, supra note 57. See also, White v. 
Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) 
("[T]he line between the commercial and noncommercial has not merely blurred; it has 
disappeared."). 
74 See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). 
75 See, e.g., McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994) (involving photographs of 
plaintiff playing fictional Spanky McFarland and use of name in association with restau­
rant); Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (involving use of 
late Princess Diana's image on variety of products); MJ & Partners Rest. Ltd. P'ship, 10 F. 
Supp. 2d 922 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (involving use of Michael Jordan's name in connection with 
restaurants); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (involving musi­
cal entertainment featuring Elvis Presley imitator); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, 21 
P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) (involving use of "The Three Stooges" images on posters and T­
shirts).
76 See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 797. 
77 See, e.g., Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1339. 
73 Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.1 (West 2002). 
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in "soft" news stories such as consumer-oriented reporting about fash­
ion or home furnishings.79 The attempt to subject these sorts of uses 
to private control has generated considerable litigation, and courts at 
this point vary widely in what they are willing to classify as commer­
cial. 80 Indeed, some commentators and judges have even argued that 
many uses of famous people's identities in advertising are protected 
by the First Amendment and cannot be subjected to private rights of 
ownership.81 Were this line of thought to prevail, the publicity right, 
and the subject of this paper, would largely evaporate. There has 
been no hint to date, however, that such an evaporation is likely, and 
indeed the current trend, at least at the legislative level, seems to 
favor ever-broader definitions of commercial use in publicity rights 
law. Nevertheless, any conclusions about the scope of publicity rights 
must factor in their somewhat unusual relationship with the federal 
Constitution. 
79 A federal court, however, recently rejected a publicity rights claim, on free speech 
grounds, that would seem to be exactly the sort of use covered by the California statute. In 
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001), the court found that 
the use of Dustin Hoffman's image to illustrate an article about current fashion was pro­
tected speech. 
80 Because the line between protected and unprotected uses is so unclear, disputes over 
this issue are common in the courts. Challenges involving uses of personas without permis­
sion in editorial content, see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text, are only one cate­
gory. Defendants are also arguing that they have a free speech right to use celebrity 
personas without permission in connection with products, services and entertainments. See 
Comedy Ill Prods., 21 P.3d at 797. However, in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball 
Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
raised questions about allowing sports figures to control the use of their images on trading 
cards, suggesting that such cards are a form of protected communication. The court ruled 
that, at least where the images were being used for purposes of parody (as was the case in 
Cardtoons), a First Amendment privilege exists. Similarly, in a case brought on behalf of 
golfer Tiger Woods against a small art publishing company for making and selling prints 
depicting Woods, a federal district court held that the use was fully privileged by the First 
Amendment. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d. 829 (N.D. Ohio 2000). This 
case is on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. For details, 
see Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Amicus Curiae Brief of Seventy-Three Law Professors 
in Support of Jireh Publishing, Inc., 22 Whittier L. Rev. 391 (2000). Even classic cases of 
advertising use may be subject to First Amendment defenses under the right circum­
stances. A recent case in New York found that a magazine advertisement poking fun at the 
mayor did not violate the mayor's publicity right, and it further noted that the advertising 
space in question, the exterior of a public bus, was a privileged forum for noncommercial 
and commercial speech alike. New York Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 987 F. Supp. 
254 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd 136 F.3d 123 {2d Cir. 1998). More than thirty years ago, actor 
and comedian Pat Paulsen also lost a suit against manufacturers of T-shirts bearing his 
image on the ground that his quasi-humorous "campaign" for the presidency made him a 
public figure who could not object to use of his name or face in conjunction with products 
bearing on the campaign. Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 
1968). 
81 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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2. State Law Issues Involving the Scope of Publicity Rights
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a. Is there a property interest recognized by the relevant
state? For the debtor-creditor system to recognize publicity rights 
and treat them as assets, those rights would have to exist in the appli­
cable jurisdiction. Currently it is unclear how many states do, or prob­
ably would, recognize an alienable property interest in the human 
persona.82 In some places, the answer is clear because case law or 
statutes on point exist.83 The situation in many other states, however, 
is ambiguous. Some seem to recognize publicity rights as property, 
but in a very limited way. New York, for example, has a statute that 
was originally designed to create a privacy protection against un­
wanted commercial appropriations. But courts have managed to tuck 
a limited recognition of publicity rights within the confines of that 
law.84 As a result, in New York, personal characteristics can be pro­
tected as property, but only where the attribute at issue is listed in the 
statute, and the property interest cannot survive the celebrity. 
Other states sometimes use the term "right of publicity" in their 
case law, but the courts do not make clear whether they are talking 
about a full-blown property right or simply about traditional privacy 
rights under a more "modem" (and somewhat inaccurate) name.85 
The majority of states simply never have had occasion to address the 
distinction between publicity and privacy rights, and, therefore, it can­
not be said safely that they will or will not eventually recognize the 
right to control commercial exploitation of a persona as a property, 
rather than solely as a privacy, interest.86 
A state's failure to recognize the right of publicity as a property 
right may not be the deciding factor, however. At least where na­
tional media are involved, virtually any claimant can find a jurisdiction 
within which to enforce his publicity rights. Indiana law permits plain­
tiffs to enforce the interest without regard to where the violation oc­
curred or where the rights holders are domiciled as long as the 
82 Perhaps the best available figure is that given by J. Thomas McCarthy in his treatise. 
McCarthy says that twenty-eight states currently recognize publicity rights. McCarthy, 
supra note 47, § 6.3. 
83 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 8-10. 
84 See Stephano v. News Group Publ'ns., 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that 
state privacy law provides protection against appropriations of property right in human 
persona and is subject to same limitations that apply to privacy actions). 
85 See, e.g., Lawrence v. A.S. Abell Co., 475 A.2d 448 (Md. 1984); see also Libel Def. 
Res. Ctr., SO-State Survey 2001-2002, Media Privacy and Related Law 7923 (2001) ( discuss­
ing Maryland law). 
86 Federal courts, however, from time to time have opined about whether one or an­
other state would protect publicity rights if the opportunity arose. See, e.g., Ventura v. 
Titan Sports, 65 F.3d 725, 730 (8th Cir. 1995) (asserting that Minnesota Supreme Court 
would recognize tort of violation of publicity rights). 
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offending publications or products were distributed or displayed in 
some way within that state.87 California recently enacted legislation 
that permits nondomiciliaries to rely on California publicity law as 
long as any violation takes place within that state's borders.88
b. Who and What Are Covered? Initially, publicity rights were
thought of as the sole province of celebrities and entertainers who 
developed and then exploited their fame for economic gain. Gradu­
ally, however, many jurisdictions began to extend coverage to any fa­
mous person, including those whose prominence came not through 
sports or entertainment, but as a secondary effect of their participa­
tion in public affairs or politics. 89 A quick look at modem advertising 
campaigns-in which the late Congressman Tip O'Neill became a 
spokesperson for American Express and former Senator Robert Dole 
the "voice" of Viagra-suggests that such individuals may indeed have 
potentially marketable rights in their personas. 
Today, several states simply have given up any attempt to limit 
publicity rights to some particular group of individuals and have taken 
the position that everyone has at least a nascent property interest in 
commercial exploitation of her identity. The Florida publicity statute, 
for example, says that commercial use of "the name, portrait, photo­
graph, or other likeness of any natural person" without permission is 
actionable.90 It is unlikely, however, that the forced sale of the public­
ity rights of an ordinary citizen would net anything for creditors; thus, 
the right is usually significant only where the individual has achieved 
some measure of renown. 
Another factor that may affect the value of the publicity right is 
the range of characteristics protected. Again, this varies from jurisdic­
tion to jurisdiction.91 In all states recognizing publicity rights, the use 
87 Ind. Code Ann.§ 32-36-1-9 (West 2002). See generally Jonathan L. Faber, Indiana: 
A Celebrity-Friendly Jurisdiction, 43 Res Gestae 24, 29 (March 2000) (noting broad reach 
of Indiana statute, regardless of celebrity's domicile). 
88 Astaire Celebrity Image Protection Act, S.B. No. 1385, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2000). There has been discussion from time to time of passing federal legislation protect­
ing publicity rights. This approach, of course, would introduce uniformity where there is 
now great diversity of approaches. One such set of proposals is discussed in Symposium, 
Rights of Publicity: An In-Depth Analysis of the New Legislative Proposals to Congress, 
16 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 209 (1998). 
89 See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., 
Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 703 (Ga. 1982) (holding that plastic bust of Dr. King violated his 
publicity rights). 
90 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 540.08 (West 2002). 
91 Some advocates of publicity rights have proposed that these variations in state law 
be "cured" by passage of a federal statute. See, e.g., Felix H. Kent, An Overview of the 
Right of Publicity, 216 N.Y.L.J. 3, 37 (1996); Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. 
Manges Lecture-The Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 
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of likenesses and names is covered. In some places, however, voices, 
signatures, and even tag lines may be protected as well.92 The offend­
ing performance or material need not even use the actual face or voice 
of the celebrity; the imitation of a famous person's voice or his ap­
pearance by another may in some jurisdictions also fall within the 
right.93 
c. Duration of Publicity Rights. The duration of publicity
rights is pertinent to debtor-creditor law in two ways. First, at least for 
truly iconic individuals, the length of time that the publicity interest 
survives will influence its present value. But it should also be recog­
nized that, especially in cases where the right survives the life of a 
celebrity, a debtor who is himself completely unknown to the public 
may nonetheless tum out to be the owner of someone else's valuable 
persona by virtue of an inheritance or a long-past intervivos transfer. 
Not all jurisdictions permit the right to survive the celebrity. Among 
those that do,94 the term varies considerably. Tennessee, for example, 
treats publicity rights a bit like a trademark, allowing the interest to 
last as long as heirs and successors continuously exploit them-poten­
tially forever.95 California follows a copyright model by permitting 
survival of the right for a maximum of seventy years after the death of 
the individual.96 Still other states permit the right to endure for the 
life of the celebrity plus 100 years.97
If a publicity right has been transferred, either by sale, gift, or at 
death by \vill or intestate succession, tracking the ownership of the 
interest may be difficult. Only a few states require successors to regis­
ter their interests in the rights of a deceased personality as a predicate 
19 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 129, 141-42 (1995); J. Eugene Salomon, Jr., Note, The Right of 
Publicity Run Riot: The Case for a Federal Statute, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1179 (1987); see also 
supra note 88. 
92 See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(considering tag line associated with Johnny Carson element of his publicity rights). 
93 See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding 
celebrity's right of publicity violated by robotic parody in advertisement); Midler v. Ford 
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding actress and singer Bette Midler's publicity 
right infringed by use in automobile commercial of singer with similar-sounding voice). 
For a discussion of the expanding definition of the protected attributes of the persona, see 
Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protect­
ing the Associative Value of Personality, 46 Hastings L.J. 853, 859-66 (1995). 
94 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.l(d) (Deering 2002); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 540.08(1)(c) 
(West 2002); Ind. Code Ann. § 32-36-1-8 (West 2002); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1448(B) 
(West 2002). 
95 Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-1104 (West 2002). 
96 Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.l(g) (Deering 2002). 
97 See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann.§ 32-36-1-8 (West 2002); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1448(G) 
(West 2002). 
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to seeking damages for infringement.98 But in no state of which we 
are aware is registration a condition of preserving the interest. In re­
ality, therefore, there is no reliable way to assure that parties have 
advance notice of who the current rights holders might be. The matter 
is further complicated by the fact that state laws are not uniform as to 
which rights survive. A recent court decision in Kentucky, for exam­
ple, interpreted the state's fifty-year survival provision to apply only in 
cases where the late individual's identity has a "significant 'commer­
cial value.' "99 Showing that the deceased was well known does not 
necessarily satisfy the requirement, the court said, and heirs and lega­
tees cannot exploit publicity rights of anyone whose persona fails to 
meet the "significant commercial value" test.100 
This Article concentrates on the celebrity who owns his or her 
own rights at the time of the relevant debt-related proceeding. But 
the value of the surviving publicity interests of deceased stars such as 
Elvis Presley and Frank Sinatra suggests that a broader range of bank­
ruptcy cases-and not just those of celebrity debtors who retain pos­
session of their publicity rights at the time of filing-may involve 
valuable publicity rights that currently are going unrecognized. 
II 
PUBLICITY AS PROPERTY OUTSIDE THE DEBTOR­
CREDITOR CONTEXT: DIVORCE AND TAXES 
Because it is so common today to see famous people successfully 
market their fame, one might have predicted that publicity rights rou­
tinely would be treated as assets by anyone with a claim against a 
celebrity. Interestingly, though, this rarely seems to be the case; the 
idea that fame is now a commodity seems to have slipped under the 
radar screens of most courts and lawyers. There have been, however, 
a small handful of "harbinger" cases in the context of taxation and 
divorce. 
In one instance, Estate of Andrews v. United States, 101 the Inter­
nal Revenue Service successfully claimed in federal district court that 
98 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.1 (f)(l)-(f)(2) (Deering 2002) (establishing that 
claimant can sue only for damages arising after registration); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, 
§ 1448(F)(l), (2) (same).
99 Montgomery v. Montgomery, 1999 WL 1086279 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1999), rev'd
on other grounds, 60 S.W.3d 524 (Ky. 2001). 
100 Id. 
101 850 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D. Va. 1994). To the extent that publicity rights generate cur­
rent income, they are, of course, captured as part of an individual's or a company's earn­
ings for income tax purposes. What is new is the recognition that these rights can be 
valued in and of themselves for a variety of reasons. For valuation of the right current 
income would serve merely as some evidence of its worth as a res. 
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the value of a deceased author's name-one of the attributes pro­
tected under the rubric of publicity rights-should be included in her 
taxable estate.102 The "celebrity" in question was V.C. Andrews, 
whose works include "Flowers in the Attic" and other novels in the 
so-called "children in jeopardy" genre. Andrews' estate had arranged 
to have further books written by a ghost writer and attributed to 
Andrews but had not listed the value of the author's name as a taxable 
asset in her estate. Several years later, the IRS sent out a deficiency 
notice.1°3 Following a trial, the district court agreed that the author's 
name was a taxable asset and assigned a $703,500 valuation to it as of 
the date of her death.104
Similarly, in divorce cases, state courts in New Jersey and New 
York have ruled that publicity rights count as part of a couple's mari­
tal assets.105 When actor and comedian Joe Piscopo and his wife di­
vorced, the New Jersey court hearing the case concluded that what it 
termed Piscopo's celebrity "good will," to the extent that it was devel­
oped during the marriage, was marital property and subject to the 
same treatment that is given in the state to a spouse's professional 
practice or license.106
New York courts in two other cases, Golub v. Golub107 and Elkus
v. Elkus, 108 permitted the spouses of actress and model Marisa Beren­
son and opera singer Frederica von Stade, respectively, to prove and
share in the value of their wives' fame to the extent that the husbands
could show they had contributed to it during the marriage.109 
102 See generally Ray D. Madoff, Taxing Personhood: Estate Taxes and the Compelled 
Commodification of Identity, 17 Va. Tax Rev. 759 (1998); Note, Federal Estate Tax and the 
Right of Publicity: Taxing Estates for Celebrity Value, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 683 (1995). 
103 Andrews, 850 F. Supp. at 1281.
104 Id. at 1295; see also Neil Caulkins, A Trustee's Duties When a Celebrity Persona is
the Asset, 83 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 31, 33 (2001) ("(V ]aluation of celebrity per­
sonas for tax purposes is . . .  similar to valuation of traditional assets in that it relies on 
expert testimony and records of like transactions to determine fair market value."). 
105 See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text. For discussion of potential valuation
methods, see Alicia Brokars Kelly, Sharing a Piece of the Future Post-Divorce: Toward a 
More Equitable Distribution of Professional Goodwill, 51 Rutgers L. Rev. 569, 604-11 
(1999); Joel A. Rakower, Quantifying Celebrity Status As a Marital Asset, 15 Fair Share 7 
(1995). See also Jonathan Kranz, Sharing the Spotlight: Equitable Distribution of the 
Right of Publicity, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. LJ. 917, 954 (1995) (explaining distinction 
between publicity rights and celebrity goodwill); Allen M. Parkman, Human Capital as 
Property in Celebrity Divorces, 29 Fam. L.Q. 141 (1995). 
106 See Piscopo v. Piscopo, 555 A.2d 1190 (N.J. Ch. 1988). 
107 527 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
108 572 N.Y.S.2d 901 (App. Div. 1991).
109 Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 901; Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 946. For a discussion of the 
implications of treating other intellectual property as marital property, see Miranda Oshige 
McGowan, Property's Portrait of a Lady, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1037, 1114-16 (2001) (consider­
ing extent to which nonauthor-spouse should have rights to dispose of copyright held by 
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Although publicity rights appear in the legal literature almost en­
tirely in contexts where the celebrity or his assignee is asserting an 
exclusive right to control and profit from the exploitation of fame, 
Andrews, Piscopo, Golub, and Elkus lend credence to the argument 
that the choice to convert the human persona into an asset subject to 
market exchange not only provides a vehicle for channeling extra ben­
efits to the famous and to their voluntary tranferees but also opens the 
door for others-whether spouses, the IRS, or unsatisfied creditors­
to assert inchoate or actual claims to the value of that fame. 
We recognize, of course, that the divorce and tax situations are 
different from debtor-creditor law in that liabilities attaching to pub­
licity interests in the former settings can be satisfied without necessa­
rily requiring that the celebrity or his assignees divest themselves of 
control over the asset. The value of the asset is shared rather than 
transferred in its entirety. This difference ( and its significance) is 
something we will discuss at length in subsequent sections. 110 The 
point here is that these cases suggest there is no reason ex ante to 
suppose that a right of publicity could not be an asset for purposes of 
the debtor-creditor system. The court in the Piscopo case noted that 
it would make no sense to treat publicity rights as full-fledged prop­
erty only when that characterization favors the celebrity or assignees 
but not when it would favor some other interest, including those of ex­
spouses.111 We suggest that the same logic applies when the interest 
in question is that of other creditors. 
III 
PUBLICITY AS PROPERTY IN THE DEBTOR-CREDITOR SYSTEM 
Any consideration of publicity rights in the debtor-creditor con­
text must be set into a framework that acknowledges the power of 
creditors' interests in our legal scheme. The debtor-creditor system 
exhibits a preference for marshalling nearly all assets and making 
author-spouse, and expressing concern that granting such right "inappropriately comrnodi­
fies a kind of property that has a peculiarly close relationship to the author's self, perhaps 
even giving the spouse the ability to commodify the author's self'). But see Rodrigue v. 
Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432, 435 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[A]n author-spouse in whom a copyright 
vests maintains exclusive managerial control of the copyright but. . .  the economic benefits 
of the copyrighted work belong to the community while it exists and to the former spouses 
in division thereafter."); Worth v. Worth, 195 Cal. Rptr. 135, 138 (Ct. App. 1987) (finding 
that "a copyright on a literary work produced during the marriage is as much a divisible 
community asset as the underlying artistic creation itselr'). 
110 See infra Part 111.C.2, IV. 
111 See Piscopo, 555 A.2d at 1192. But see Robin P. Rosen, Note, A Critical Analysis of 
Celebrity Careers as Property upon Dissolution of Marriage, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 522 
(1993) (arguing that celebrity careers are not property under traditional definitions of 
property). 
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them available to satisfy unpaid creditors, regardless of any discom­
fort and indignity the process inflicts on the debtor. 
The modem state is not as heavy-handed in favoring creditors as 
earlier legal systems have been. There is no parallel in contemporary 
American debtor-creditor law to the Roman law, permitting a debtor 
to be killed and his creditors to cut his body into proportional parts 
for nonpayment of debts.112 Nor are debt peonage and enslavement 
of debtors still in favor,113 although it remains possible to be impris­
oned for failure to pay certain debts, such as child support.114 The
disappearance of overtly draconian laws does not mean, however, that 
the state gives modem creditors only modest rights to collect what 
they are owed. 
Legal institutions do not merely enforce terms (including those 
creating security interests115) in a contract that originally created the
debtor-creditor relationship. They also entitle unpaid creditors to the 
value of wholly unrelated assets of the debtor. In some instances, laws 
112 See generally Richard Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 Mich. L. Rev. 24, 24-25 
(1926) (reporting on Ancient Roman law). 
113 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2001) (abolishing peonage and declaring null and 
void "all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, 
which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of which any at­
tempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the 
voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt 
or obligation, or otherwise"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2001) ("Whoever holds or returns 
any person to a condition of peonage, or arrests any person with the intent of placing him 
in or returning him to a condition of peonage, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than 20 years, or both."); Peter J. Coleman, Debtors and Creditors in America: 
Insolvency, Imprisonment for Debt, and Bankruptcy 250-53 (1974); cf. Paul Rock, Making 
People Pay 219-58 (1973) {presenting sociological study of English debt collection process, 
including imprisonment, prior to legislative changes that substituted attachment of earn­
ings for imprisonment). 
114 See Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2001). 
115 See U.C.C. § 9-203 (2000) (explaining how to create a security interest, or to make it 
"attach"); id.§ 9-601 (delineating rights of secured creditor to take possession of and fore­
close on property interests of debtor in event of debtor's default). See generally Shubha 
Ghosh, The Morphing of Property Rules and Liability Rules: An Intellectual Property 
Optimist Examines Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 8 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 
99, 115-16 (1997) ("At the state level, a secured creditor can sue a defaulting debtor and 
attach the underlying collateral described in the financing statement. The right to attach 
usually means the right to sell the collateral."). Although commentators vary in how they 
characterize the nature of a security interest in collateral, they agree that it has at least 
some attributes of a property right, as well as those of a contract right. See, e.g., Thomas 
W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 773,
834-35 (2001) (describing borderline nature of security interest, given its property aspects
and contract aspects); Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Immovable Ob­
ject Versus the Irresistible Force: Rethinking the Relationship Between Secured Credit
and Bankruptcy Policy, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2234 (1997); cf. In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252
F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2001) (drawing distinction between security interest and
ownership).
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automatically create statutory liens in favor of creditors.116 And even 
unsecured creditors (those who lack contractual rights to recover from 
specified assets) have powerful legal tools to help them get the value 
of a debtor's property when he fails to pay. For example, under state 
law, once a creditor receives a judgment from a court, it may be able 
to garnish part of the debtor's wages or instruct the local sheriff to 
levy on the debtor's property.117 The sheriff may even be personally 
liable to the creditor if the sheriff comes up empty-handed.118 
Thus, when a debtor owes money to a creditor, the identification 
of all the debtor's assets is of paramount importance. To the extent 
that fame is commodified, we argue that it is therefore appropriate to 
consider whether it, too, should be part of what is up for grabs. 
Although the federal bankruptcy system is only one of several 
fora in which creditors stake claims to a debtor's property interests, 
we will use bankruptcy as the framework for the detailed discussion of 
publicity rights in the debtor-creditor system because the require­
ments of the bankruptcy system relating to property rights provide the 
clearest and most broadly applicable legal framework against which to 
examine and test our thesis. Different parts of the bankruptcy law 
satisfy the claims of creditors in different ways. In chapter 7, creditors 
generally are supposed to receive payment from the sale of the 
debtor's assets to the highest bidder. By contrast, if the debtor files 
under one of the reorganization chapters, such as chapters 11, 12, or 
13, she will be permitted to keep her property but must pay creditors 
from future income at least, and sometimes more than, what they 
would have received from the liquidation of that property in chapter 
7. Because the chapter 7 entitlement establishes the benchmark for
the other types of bankruptcy, and in order to simplify the analysis,
our discussion assumes that the type of relief sought is that provided
by chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.119 
116 See, e.g., Scott M. Martin & Peter W. Smith, The Unconstitutionality of State Motion 
Picture Film Lien Laws (Or How Spike Lee Almost Lost It), 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 59, 63-79 
(1989) (describing New York film lien laws that give certain creditors rights in film). See 
generally James N. Duca, The Interaction Between Mechanic's Lien Laws and the Bank­
ruptcy Code, 53 Bus. Law. 1283 (1998) ( discussing treatment of state lien laws in 
bankruptcy). 
117 See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 Yale L.J. 1, 9-10 (1998). 
118 See, e.g., Vitale v. Hotel California, Inc., 446 A.2d 880 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1982) (discussing sheriff's default of duty in failing to properly execute judgment against 
debtor). 
119 11 u.s.c. §§ 701-784 (2001). 
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A. Treatment of a Debtor's Property Interests under Chapter 7 of
the Bankruptcy Code 
Whether a federal bankruptcy case is initiated voluntarily by the 
debtor or involuntarily by creditors, 120 the bankruptcy system is, at 
least in theory, a creditor's remedy insofar as it gives creditors access 
to the value of nearly all of the debtor's assets. Thus, although the 
Bankruptcy Code offers no definition of property, the bankruptcy sys­
tem places a premium on identifying "all legal or equitable interests of 
the debtor in property" because the bankruptcy "estate" will be com­
prised of those interests.121 The implementation of this system de­
pends largely on self-reporting; the debtor is expected to disclose all 
property interests, 122 and failure to identify assets can lead to denial of 
bankruptcy relief,123 as well as to criminal sanctions.124
A form of wealth identified as property of the estate ultimately 
will be liquidated for the benefit of creditors,125 unless the property is 
exempt, 126 abandoned due to lack of value to the estate, 127 or is sub­
ject to some other applicable restriction that prevents its use for a 
given purpose.128 Once the trustee has administered the estate, the 
120 See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2001) (authorizing the filing of involuntary bankruptcy petitions 
if certain criteria are satisfied); see also News Release, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts 
(Feb. 19, 2002), at http://www.uscourts.gov/press_releases/cy01bk.pdf (tracking bankruptcy 
filings). 
121 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2001).
122 See Official Forms Schedule A (requiring that debtor list all real property), B (re­
quiring that debtor list all personal property), and C (requiring that debtor designate all 
property that debtor claims to be exempt); see also Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936, 945-46 
(9th Cir. 2001) (noting affirmative duty on debtor to schedule assets and liabilities and to 
prepare schedules "carefully, completely, and accurately") (citations omitted). 
123 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2001) (providing grounds for objections to discharge). 
124 18 U.S.C. § 152 (2001) (criminalizing concealment of assets).
125 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726 (2001) (providing claim priority and distribution scheme). 
126 Id., § 522. Exempt property is property that the Bankruptcy Code or applicable 
nonbankruptcy law (and sometimes state constitutions) say cannot be reached by un­
secured creditors. Such laws generally list exempt property by both type and dollar limita­
tions. Among the kinds of property often made the subject of state law exemptions are 
equity in a home, home furnishings, and all or part of the value of a car. Some homestead 
exemptions are extremely generous, such as those found in Florida, Texas, Iowa, South 
Dakota, and Kansas. See National Bankruptcy Review Commission Final Report, Bank­
ruptcy: The Next Twenty Years, 299 annex D (1997). Legislative exemption schemes also 
tend to exempt property of low monetary value but tremendous personal importance, such 
as family portraits and wedding rings. See id. at 117-18. 
127 Id., § 554 (authorizing abandonment of property of estate that is burdensome or of
inconsequential value to estate). 
128 For example, although a debtor's rights under a government license may be property
of the estate, whether the property interest can be freely administered in bankruptcy is an 
entirely different matter. See generally NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 254 
F.3d 130 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 70 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2002) (No. 01-653);
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court grants an individual chapter 7 debtor a discharge, 129 unless the 
debtor has engaged in some sort of wrongdoing.130 The discharge in­
junction permanently prohibits most creditors from collecting any fur­
ther on prepetition debts.131 
Given its central role in defining the rights of creditors to the 
value of assets, such as publicity rights, a close look at the term "prop­
erty of the estate" in bankruptcy cases is in order.132 As previously 
noted, the Bankruptcy Code does not attempt to define property, and 
applicable nonbankruptcy law plays a large role in establishing the 
baseline for what in bankruptcy constitutes a property right. If some­
thing is a property right under state law, it is also likely to qualify as 
property of the estate.133 Courts sometimes take an expansive view of 
"interests in property" in an effort to capture rights of the debtor that 
have value to creditors.134 
A debtor's interest in tangible property, such as a house, boat, or 
car, may seem the easiest to identify, but the bankruptcy system also 
has long recognized the debtor's interest in intangible assets as part of 
the estate in bankruptcy.135 The debtor's rights in intellectual prop-
In re Cent. Ark. Broad. Co., 68 F.3d 213 (8th Cir. 1995). See also Cal. Bd. of Equalization 
v. MGM Liquor Warehouse, 52 B.R. 77 (D. Minn. 1985).
129 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2001) (establishing discharge injunction).
130 See, e.g., § 727 (delineating grounds for objecting to discharge, such as failing to list
all assets). 
131 § 524(a). The discharge injunction does not give total protection to the debtor 
against creditor collection efforts. A creditor can try to collect its debt after bankruptcy if 
its debt fits into an exception to discharge (e.g., debts incurred by fraud or willful and 
malicious injury),§ 523(a), or if during the bankruptcy case the creditor made a new con­
tract with the debtor, known as a reaffirmation agreement, in which the debtor agrees to be 
liable for that debt even after discharge. See § 524(c)-(d). Creditors that have security 
interests in property of the debtor ( e.g., home mortgage lender, car lender) also can repos­
sess that property after bankruptcy if the debtor does not pay, although the debtor has no 
personal liability for those debts. § 524(a). And, of course, the discharge injunction does 
not prevent creditors from attempting to collect any debts incurred after the bankruptcy. 
132 Of course, only the debtor's interest in the property will be property of the estate.
See Thomas E. Plank, The Outer Boundaries of the Bankruptcy Estate, 47 Emory L.J. 
1193, 1194-95 (1998). 
133 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Elements of Bankruptcy 5 (3d ed. 2001) ("Knowing
the outcome under nonbankruptcy law can go a long way toward understanding the prob­
lem in bankruptcy."). See generally Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398 (1992) (holding 
that in absence of any controlling federal law, "property" and "interests in property" are 
creatures of state law). 
134 See A. Mechele Dickerson, From Jeans to Genes: The Evolving Nature of Property
of the Estate, 15 Bankr. Dev. J. 285, 293-94 (1999) (explaining that courts interpret Bank­
ruptcy Code's property-of-estate concept "to include everything of value the debtor pos­
sesses even if the property, or the debtor's interest in that property, is 'novel"'). 
135 See, e.g., Bd. of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924) (concluding that debtor's mem­
bership in Chicago Board of Trade was property passing to trustee in bankruptcy). 
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erty such as patents, 136 copyrights, 137 trademarks, 138 and trade 
secrets139 are assets that can be included.140 This is consistent with the 
fact that commercial law and intellectual property law permit and rec­
ognize the creation of security interests in these kinds of assets.141
The boundaries on property of the estate have a temporal ele­
ment as well. Again, using a basic chapter 7 liquidation case as our 
model, property of the estate will be composed primarily of property 
rights held by the debtor at the commencement of the case.142 The 
date of filing establishes what property will or will not be included in 
the bankruptcy estate.143 Once an asset is deemed to be property of 
the estate, the estate also includes any value that flows from the prop­
erty in the form of "proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or 
from property of the estate."144 In the case of intellectual property, 
136 See, e.g., Szombathy v. Controlled Shredders, Inc., No. 97-C481, 1997 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 5168 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 1997) (noting that debtor listed patent for shredder as asset 
of bankruptcy estate). 
137 See, e.g., Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936, 946 (9th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging copy­
righted compositions as assets under bankruptcy plan). 
138 See, e.g., Licensing by Paolo, Inc. v. Sinatra (In re Gucci), 126 F.3d 380, 385 (2d Cir. 
1997); Adams Apple Distrib. Co. v. Papeleras Reunidas, S.A., 773 F.2d 925, 931 (7th Cir. 
1985) ("[T ]rademark is an asset of a bankrupt's estate which is saleable in bankruptcy 
proceedings along with the bankrupt's goodwill or tangible business assets."); see also Am. 
Sleek Craft, Inc. v. Nescher, 131 B.R. 991 (D. Ariz. 1991) (determining whether trade 
names are corporate asset of bankrupt corporation). 
139 See, e.g., Harmon v. McGee (In re McGee), 157 B.R. 966 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993); see 
also Lars S. Smith, Trade Secrets in Commercial Transactions and Bankruptcy, 40 IDEA 
549, 570-74 (2000) (explaining that trade secrets are included in property of estate and 
noting adverse consequences of failing to list trade secrets as property interests). 
140 Chesapeake Fiber Packaging Corp. v. Sebro Packaging Corp., 143 B.R. 360, 372 (D. 
Md. 1992) ("[l]t is undisputed that the property of the debtor's estate includes the debtor's 
intellectual property, such as interest in patents, trademarks, and copyrights." (citing 
United States v. Inslaw Inc., 932 F.2d 1467, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1991))). 
141 See, e.g., In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
security interest in patent should be perfected in accordance with state law, not by filing 
record in Patent and Trademark Office). Intellectual property interests are generally con­
sidered general intangibles under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C. 
§ 9-102(a)(42) (2000). See generally Richard M. Cieri & Michelle M. Morgan, Licensing
Intellectual Property and Technology from the Fmancially-Troubled or Startup Company:
Prebankruptcy Strategies to Minimize the Risk in a Licensee's Intellectual Property and
Technology Investment, 55 Bus. Law. 1649, 1697 n.165 (2000) (collecting cases on require­
ments for perfecting security interests in intellectual property).
142 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2001) (providing that estate includes, inter alia, "all legal or equi­
table interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case"). 
143 See generally Everett v. Judson, 228 U.S. 474, 479 (1913) (noting that purpose of 
bankruptcy is to cleave time such that property owned by debtor at time of filing is prop­
erty of estate, whereas property acquired postpetition is not). The fact that the property 
may be in the hands of a party other than the debtor is not determinative. For example, 
money received postpetition for work performed prepetition is property of the estate. 
144 11 U.S.C. § 541 a(6) (2001). See generally Louis M. Phillips & Tanya Martinez 
Shively, Ruminations on Property of the Estate-Does Anyone Know Why a Debtor's 
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for example, the estate may include subsequent income-for example, 
royalties from copyrighted songs-generated by a preexisting asset.145
There is, however, a sharp legal divide-even if it is sometimes 
blurry in practice-between money generated postpetition by prop­
erty and money generated by an individual's services. Profits or pro­
ceeds from services performed by an individual debtor after the 
commencement of the case do not qualify as property of the estate.146
Such postpetition earnings receive special protection in the liquidation 
context, it is commonly said, in order to preserve the debtor's incen­
tive to be productive after the bankruptcy is concluded.147 If past
creditors were entitled to the debtor's ongoing income, even in bank­
ruptcy, the debtor might have little reason to be innovative or 
hardworking in the future, a result that would serve no one's inter­
est.148 Thus, to honor this statutory distinction, it is important to de­
termine whether income generated postpetition flows from a 
preexisting property right or instead from the debtor's postpetition 
labor.149
Postpetition Earnings, Generated by Her Own Earning Capacity, Are Not Property of the 
Bankruptcy Estate?, 58 La. L. Rev. 623, 630-32 {1998). 
145 See, e.g., Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936, 945 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Dillon, 219 B.R.
781, 784 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1998) {holding that royalties received postpetition from songs 
created prepetition are rooted in prebankruptcy past and are property of estate). 
146 11 U.S.C. § 541{a)(6) (2001) (excluding from property of estate "earnings from ser­
vices performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case"); cf. id., 
§ 1306 (providing that postpetition earnings are property of estate in chapter 13 repayment
plan context).
147 See generally Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934) (setting forth rationale for
protecting future human capital). 
148 Id.
149 See, e.g., Towers v. Wu (In re Wu), 173 B.R. 411, 414 {B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994). In 
determining whether renewal commissions paid to the debtor postpetition constituted in­
come from the debtor's postpetition services, the court focused on the rights and obliga­
tions of the debtor under an employment agreement and on whether receipt of 
commissions was dependent on the performance of postpetition services. This issue arises 
as well in the context of covenants not to compete, where the debtor will receive the pay­
ment postpetition, but will not actually be doing any affirmative work ( other than re­
fraining from competing) in order to be entitled to that payment. Perhaps most relevant to 
our analysis, some cases have also rested their conclusion that postpetition income under 
these circumstances belongs to the estate, and not to the debtor, on the ground that the 
payments are really for a commodified intangible completely disconnected from any activ­
ity by a debtor. In one case, the court wrote: "The fact the anti-competition payments 
must be paid even in the event of Johnson's death indicates it is Johnson's good will and 
not his services that are being sold." Johnson v. Taxel (In re Johnson), 178 B.R. 216, 220 
{B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995). The court added that: "The anti-competition payments are a 
method of paying for the value of Johnson's name, and for insuring that Pioneer Centers 
will receive all of the good will previously owned by Johnson Corp. The good will and the 
value of Johnson's name in the Porsche business were established pre-petition." Id. at 219. 
But see In re Hammond, 35 B.R. 219 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983) (postpetition noncompeti-
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Having highlighted the relevant aspects of the role of property 
interests in chapter 7, we turn to the issue of how publicity rights fit 
into this scheme. We note at the outset that we cannot inform our 
analysis by dra,ving on practical experiences with the treatment of 
publicity rights in bankruptcy because we have found no evidence, in­
cluding in the case law, to suggest that famous bankrupts have been 
required to account for this interest, notwithstanding the surprisingly 
large roster of famous bankruptcy alumni.150 Although it is possible 
that their fame as a potential asset affected the negotiations in indirect 
ways, 151 that is quite different from specifically identifying publicity 
rights as assets and administering them accordingly. 
We think that this absence is more likely to reflect a failure to 
recognize fame as an asset than to represent an affirmative determina­
tion that it should be excluded from consideration.152 As we noted 
earlier, some critics of the bankruptcy system have emphasized that, in 
tion payments conditioned on debtor's compliance with covenant were not property of 
estate, and debtor could not be compelled to perform services for benefit of his creditors). 
150 For a partial list, see supra notes 12 to 42 and accompanying text. The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently came close to broaching the issue, but ultimately 
decided the case on other grounds. See Cusano, 264 F.3d at 949-50 (dismissing musician's 
right of publicity claim as barred by statute of limitations). Even this court dealt more with 
the tort cause of action aspects of the right of publicity rather than with the inchoate right 
itself. 
151 See, e.g., Eliot Kleinberg, Reynolds Gets out from Under Bankruptcy, Palm Beach 
Post, Oct. 8, 1998, at lB (reporting on confirmed plan of reorganization in Burt Reynolds's 
chapter 11 bankruptcy case, and noting that "Reynolds's show-business resurgence and 
prospects for increased income, which followed his Oscar nomination for 'Boogie Nights,' 
helped push through the agreement"). Yet, Reynolds's unsecured creditors still will re­
ceive less than twenty cents on the dollar, according to creditors' lawyers. Id.; see also 
Mitch Lipka, Actor's Bankruptcy in Freeze-Frame; Judge Orders Reynolds' Lawyers to 
Fmalize Repayment Plan for Creditors, Sun-Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale), Apr. 16, 1998, at 
1B (listing Reynolds's creditors and debts). 
152 There might be other, albeit more ad hoc, methods of taking account of publicity 
rights in bankruptcy that are not dependent on recognizing publicity rights as an asset. For 
example, a trustee, court or creditor might use evidence of a famous person's valuable 
publicity rights as the basis of a claim that the debtor filed the bankruptcy case in bad faith, 
justifying its dismissal. This is somewhat analogous to the circumstances in cases such as 
Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 1994), in which the Court of 
Appeals upheld the dismissal "for cause" under 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2001) of a doctor's 
bankruptcy case. In Huckfeldt, a debtor attempted to undercut his divorce decree by sad­
dling his ex-spouse with large enough debts to force her into bankruptcy. The court relied 
in part on the high salary Huckfeldt would shortly command when he finished his fellow­
ship and began his career as a surgeon. The court characterized his choice to file for bank­
ruptcy while he was still earning a fellow's stipend as an attempt to manipulate his current 
earnings to the disadvantage of his former wife. Id. at 832; see also In re Altchek, 124 B.R. 
944, 956 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (excluding debtor's postpetition earnings from property of 
estate, but noting that creditors have alternative remedy of moving for conversion or dis­
missal under § 1112, alleging that debtor cannot effectuate feasible plan without those 
postpetition earnings). 
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a number of high-profile celebrity bankruptcy cases, individuals were 
permitted to file for relief and receive a discharge of their debts ,vith­
out liquidating many of their assets or paying their creditors in full. 
One might question whether this problem is important enough to jus­
tify rewriting all of American personal bankruptcy law, but it has been 
highly enough publicized that we doubt courts would purposefully de­
cide to exclude the value of fame from celebrities' estates in bank­
ruptcy without so much as a comment. Given the current realities of 
the market for fame, it seems certain that requiring a well-known indi­
vidual or her successors to treat her right of publicity as an asset 
could, in many instances, provide greater fairness to creditors in the 
debtor-creditor system.1s3 
B. Fitting Publicity Rights into Property of the Estate
As previously noted, a right of publicity, to be an asset in a liqui­
dation, would have to fit within both the substantive and temporal 
parameters of "property of the estate."154 At least facially, it seems 
to fit into even the most conservative interpretations of "interests in 
153 Of course, we recognize the possibility that famous persons, who are likely to have 
access to sophisticated legal advice, might be able to arrange their financial affairs in a way 
that would protect them against the risk of having to forfeit such valuable assets. How this 
might be done, and what preventative legal measures might be appropriate to avoid such a 
result are, however, beyond the scope of this Article. 
154 This is the case whether or not the debtor has licensed a third party to use her name, 
face, or other aspects of her identity, because the debtor, unless she has transferred her 
publicity rights wholesale to a third party, is still the owner of the underlying right. It may 
not always be clear after the fact whether the originator of a publicity right transferred it to 
a third party outright or merely gave him a limited license for a specific use. See, e.g., 
Microsoft Corp. v. Dak Indus., Inc. (In re Dak Indus., Inc.), 66 F.3d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 
1995) (considering economic realities of arrangement and deciding that there was lump­
sum sale of software units to Dak prior to bankruptcy, not license for use of intellectual 
property). See generally Cieri & Morgan, supra note 141, at 1654-59 (distinguishing be­
tween outright transfer, assignment and license, and effect of these distinctions on treat­
ment in bankruptcy). Licenses may cover a specific geographic area or be for specific 
purposes or a limited time. Even an outright grant may transfer all rights only in a specific 
context or for a particular attribute (such as a voice). Of course, debtors who believe they 
have licensed their publicity rights for an overly-modest sum might also seek to reject such 
executory contracts under 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2001). See Delightful Music Ltd. v. Taylor, 913 
F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1990) (permitting debtor in possession to reject executory contract); In re 
Noonan, 17 B.R. 793 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (same). But see In re Carrere, 64 B.R. 156,
160 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (finding that § 365 concerning assumption or rejection of con­
tract does not apply to personal services contract in bankruptcy case). Although § 365(n)
governs the assumption or rejection of many types of intellectual property licensing agree­
ments in which the debtor is the licensor, it will not govern licenses for publicity rights,
which, like trademarks, are not expressly included in the definition of intellectual property
in 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2001).
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property," particularly because of its alienability.155 Even if a famous 
debtor has not exploited her publicity rights prior to the commence­
ment of the bankruptcy case, she nevertheless owns a valuable prop­
erty interest that she could exploit, created by actions taken prior to 
the filing of her petition.156 Assuming the chapter 7 context, the liqui­
dation of this asset for the benefit of creditors would seem a logical 
outcome.157 
In some cases, it may be difficult to classify payments received 
postpetition by the celebrity debtor. Depending on the circumstances, 
money received postpetition could be excludable income from postpe­
tition personal services, or, instead, ineluctable proceeds from the pre­
existing publicity right. But these types of questions are not unique to 
publicity rights in bankruptcy.158 For example, in cases involving pro­
fessionals, courts sometimes have been called upon to distinguish in­
come that flows from the individual's actual services from the value of 
the good\vill that flows from his established practice or business.159 
155 See supra Part I; see also McCarthy, supra note 47, § 10:13 (explaining that rights of 
publicity are assignable and are not subject to the antiassignment in gross trademark rules). 
Indeed, as noted in supra Part I.B.2(c), publicity rights could be property of the estate in 
the bankruptcy case of a transferee of publicity rights. For example, if Kim Basinger trans­
ferred her publicity rights to her nonfamous cousin Shelby, and Shelby filed for bank­
ruptcy, it would seem clear that publicity rights were an asset of Shelby's bankruptcy 
estate. In such a case, it would be even more clear that they can comfortably have this 
status. 
156 If the debtor is not a classic celebrity, and has no track record of seeking outlets for 
marketing her persona, the interest (if it exists under state law) may be of such limited 
value that it has no benefit for the creditors. In such an instance, the trustee may abandon 
the interest to the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 554 (2001) (permitting trustee to abandon any 
property of estate that is burdensome to estate or that is of inconsequential value and 
benefit to estate). Or, the debtor might use assets other than property of the estate to 
reacquire the property interest for a nominal sum. 
157 See Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 48 F.2d 704, 710 (2d Cir.
1931) (finding that copyrights held by bankrupt publisher, having been transferred by com­
posers, were now in bankruptcy estate, and rejecting composer's arguments that there was 
implied covenant that bankrupt publisher itself had to publish songs and that copyright 
could not be transferred). 
153 In Szombathy v. Controlled Shredders, Inc., No. 97-C481, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
5168 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 1997), for example, the court had to decide whether the debtor's 
postbankruptcy development of new technology belonged to the debtor personally or be­
longed to the estate. The court decided that the technology belonged to the debtor, char­
acterizing it as the debtor's postpetition activity. Cf. In re Gucci, 202 B.R. 686, 690-91 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that debtor's postpetition designs belonged to purchaser 
of trademark). The temporal divide questions are also inherent in divorce proceedings. 
See, e.g., Roddenberry v. Roddenberry, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 907 (Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting 
claim of Star Trek creator's first wife that she retained ongoing profit participation interest 
in generic literary property). 
159 See, e.g., In re Prince, 85 F.3d 314 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that§ 541(a)(6) exception 
does not preclude considering goodwill in value of stock in orthodontist's sole proprietor­
ship); Fitzsimmons v. Walsh (In re Fitzsimmons), 725 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1984) (hold-
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Although sensitive and difficult, this type of line drawing is one with 
which the bankruptcy system regularly copes. 
Thus, rights of publicity do not appear uniquely to strain either 
the substantive or temporal limitations on property of the estate. As a 
consequence, it would seem reasonable on the face of the matter to 
count this form of property as property of the estate and thus as part 
of the creditors' entitlement-unless, of course, it is exempt as a mat­
ter either of state160 or federal law. A similar analysis would apply in 
debtor-creditor actions under state law.161
C. A Closer Look at the Bar Against Conscripting Future Labor
As noted in our previous discussion, the fruits of the individual 
chapter 7 A debtor's postpetition labor are not property of the es­
tate.162 Identifying the boundary between existing property (and the 
income that flows from it) and future labor is tricky because, despite 
the intense concern of celebrities and lawmakers with recognizing and 
expanding the right of publicity, not very much careful thinking has 
gone into analyzing what the right actually is: whether it inheres solely 
in the famous individual's identifying characteristics or whether it also 
includes elements of performance by the celebrity as well. In other 
words, if publicity rights are to be put on the auction block, what ex­
actly does their purchaser acquire? If the right of publicity is, in part, 
a right to future cooperation from, and performances by, the famous 
person, does part of the right of publicity fall outside the boundaries 
of property of the estate? And, even if publicity encompasses only 
passive rights, would sale of such an interest nonetheless have an im­
permissibly inhibitory impact on a celebrity's ability to benefit from 
her future labor? 
ing that § 541(a)(6) exception applies only to services performed personally by individual 
debtor, with remainder of income from lawyer's sole proprietorship belonging to bank­
ruptcy estate); In re Weber, 209 B.R. 793, 798 n.6 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (providing sum­
mary of courts' approaches in distinguishing between income for postpetition services and 
estate property). See generally Susan Gummow, Earnings Exception, 98 Com. L.J. 379 
(1993). 
160 At least one state, Illinois, exempts publicity rights from levy or attachment, al­
though the statute does permit creditors to reach income earned from the exploitation of 
the rights. 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1075/15 (West 2002). 
161 State law may offer the additional option of garnishment for creditors to benefit 
from the value of the debtor's asset if the debtor is actively exploiting it. 
162 11 U.S.C. § 54l{a)(6) {2001) (excluding "earnings from services performed by an 
individual debtor after the commencement of the case"). 
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1. How Should the Property Interest in Publicity Be Bounded?
1351 
Addressing these questions in the order they have been posed, we
turn first to the question of what can be sold in bankruptcy under the 
rubric of publicity rights. In a voluntary transaction, the purchaser or 
licensee of another's publicity rights might bargain to obtain both the 
ability to use a celebrity's name or likeness and the ability to call on 
the celebrity to perform in future commercials or to make public ap­
pearances on behalf of a product or service. The parties may not be 
concerned with articulating whether the publicity right covers both the 
use of his identity and of the celebrity's labor. But if, for example, 
Michael Jordan's publicity rights were sold to a third party to satisfy 
creditors' claims, the purchaser ought not to expect that she could re­
quire Jordan to travel around the country to promote a new energy 
drink as its official spokesperson. 
Although little attention has been given to a precise definition of 
the term, we suggest that state-law-created publicity rights are prop­
erly understood as purely passive in nature; any associated right to 
command active participation by a celebrity should be understood as 
arising separately as a result of a specifically negotiated contract 
term.163 This interpretation makes sense in light of current practices 
and best comports with existing legal principles. Simply put, publicity 
163 There are some cases suggesting that the publicity right encompasses both a celeb­
rity's attributes and all her performances as well. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) ("human cannonball" has publicity rights in his perform­
ances); Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956) (acknowledg­
ing that boxer has property right, distinct from privacy right, in performance footage). We 
believe, however, that publicity rights do not cover performances per se, and that the cases 
suggesting the contrary were using the term "publicity rights" when the problem was actu­
ally something more closely akin to common law misappropriation. See, e.g., Int'l News 
Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (finding it illegal to appropriate news reporting 
of competitor). Publicity rights are commodified interests subject to alienation. It is diffi­
cult, logically, to reconcile the notion of alienability, so much at the heart of how publicity 
rights are defined both by the courts and by legislatures, with an extension of the right to 
performances. If performance were truly an aspect of the publicity right, an individual who 
exercised her option to transfer all or part of her property interest in her persona might 
then be faced with having also sold the right to benefit from (and possibly control) some or 
all of her future performances. As noted in infra the text accompanying notes 171-75, the 
law in other contexts strongly disfavors such a result, and it should not be assumed that 
either courts or legislators intended to ratify it in the publicity context. For this reason, we 
believe that the definition of the right as "passive" and not one that implicates actual per­
formances is correct. But, even if the authors of this Article are wrong in their definition 
of the right, the basic scheme set out in the paper would not change. Because of the rules 
against conscription of future services in bankruptcy, only that part of the publicity right 
that could be exploited passively should be subject to forced sale. As noted below, how­
ever, some limit on the future performances of a bankrupt celebrity would be necessary to 
prevent the individual from infringing on the rights that were transferred. See infra notes 
168-72 and accompanying text.
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rights, standing alone, do not include the right to direct a person's 
future labor. 
As a practical matter, many of the most valued existing publicity 
rights-for example those of such celebrity personas as Elvis 
Presley164 or The Three Stooges165-must perforce be entirely passive. 
The individuals in question are dead and could scarcely be expected to 
"participate" in new forms of commercial exploitation of their identi­
ties. This does not seem to present serious impediments to economic 
enjoyment of the property in question. The name, attributes, existing 
images, artistic renderings, and even computer-generated or manipu­
lated images of the celebrity are all usable without requiring the celeb­
rity, dead or alive, to do anything after the property right in question 
has been transferred. 
Even if the interest arguably would be worth more (particularly if 
the debtor is bankrupt) were it to include a right to call on living ce­
lebrities for future performances, existing law creates formidable bar­
riers to enforcing such an interest. In the first place, forcing a debtor 
to perform at the behest of the asset purchaser evokes a deep-seated 
social and even constitutional unease with arrangements that smack of 
involuntary servitude.166 Clearly, the celebrity's performance would 
neither be for his own benefit nor depend on his own wishes, but 
would instead be for the benefit of the purchaser and, indirectly, the 
creditors ( who might be able to command a higher price if they could 
convey both the celebrity's services and the right to make "passive" 
uses of his persona). 
164 See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capace, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998) (recogniz­
ing publicity and trademark claims against "Velvet Elvis" service mark); Elvis Presley En­
ters., Inc. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that seller of Elvis 
memorabilia violated Presley's publicity right). 
l65 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) (ruling that use of image 
of Three Stooges on posters and t-shirts violates their publicity rights). 
l66 The Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States bars both slav­
ery and involuntary servitude. The amendment was one passed in the aftermath of the 
Civil War and has generally been applied where issues of race discrimination have been 
implicated. See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (finding support in Thir­
teenth Amendment for holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) outlawed private conspiracies to 
deprive citizens of their constitutional rights because of race). However, in Jones v. Alfred 
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968), the Court said that the amendment was an "abso­
lute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the
United States." This language suggests that the amendment protects all citizens, regardless
of race, against involuntary servitude. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law 331-34 (2d ed. 1988). Although the question remains unresolved, it is difficult to be­
lieve, given the history of the United States with slavery, that the Supreme Court would
interpret the Constitution to permit slavery or involuntary servitude to be imposed on
individuals, no matter what the grounds for selection of those to be so burdened.
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In light of the fact that filing for bankruptcy is a "privilege" of­
fered by the government, rather than a constitutional right,167 one 
might be tempted to counterargue that any "servitude" that results 
from the sale of assets, at least in a voluntary bankruptcy case, would 
itself be "voluntary." We do not find this argument a convincing basis 
for treating the publicity right, even in the bankruptcy context, as em­
bodying rights to personal services. For one thing, if we assume that 
every citizen has a constitutional right not to be subjected to involun­
tary servitude, 168 making a benefit like bankruptcy available only if 
the recipient agrees to "perform or forego an activity that a preferred 
constitutional right normally protects from interference" may call into 
play the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine.169 Even if the govern-
167 See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434,446 (1973) (denying request for fee waiver 
for filing bankruptcy petition, and holding that there is no constitutional right to obtain 
discharge in bankruptcy). The Court stated: 
Kras' alleged interest in the elimination of his debt burden, and in obtaining 
his desired new start in life, although important and so recognized by the en­
actment of the Bankruptcy Act, does not rise to the same constitutional level 
[as marriage or marriage dissolution] .... If Kras is not discharged in bank­
ruptcy, his position will not be materially altered in any constitutional sense. 
Gaining or not gaining a discharge will effect no change with respect to basic 
necessities. We see no fundamental interest that is gained or lost depending on 
the availability of a discharge in bankruptcy. 
Id. at 445. 
168 See supra note 166. 
169 See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (finding it unconstitu­
tional to prohibit federally funded legal services lawyers from representing clients in ac­
tions to amend or challenge validity of welfare laws). See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413, 1499-1500 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With Particular Refer­
ence to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. Rev. 593, 593-94 (1990) (noting that 
doctrine "operates as a shorthand response to the view that those who voluntarily partici­
pate in government programs have 'waived' their constitutional objections, and also to the 
claim that the government's power not to create a regulatory program necessarily includes 
the power to impose on that program whatever conditions it chooses"). 
At least one bankruptcy scholar has raised the issue of unconstitutional conditions in 
the context of consumer bankruptcy. See Karen Gross, The Debtor As Modern Day Peon: 
A Problem of Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 165, 205 (1990) (rais­
ing this argument in context of conditioning debt relief on completion of repayment plan 
under chapter 13 of Bankruptcy Code). See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1307, 1321-1328 
(2001). In chapter 13, the debtor need not forfeit nonexempt assets; rather, the debtor's 
discharge is generally conditioned upon completion of a repayment plan funded, presuma­
bly, out of the debtor's future income. In other words, a debtor who is deemed ineligible 
for chapter 7 bankruptcy relief but "needs" a discharge of debt has no tolerable "choice" 
but to work for the benefit of creditors. See id. § 1328. Forcing a debtor, as a condition of 
receiving bankruptcy relief, to contribute performance in the future to the purchaser of 
publicity rights might raise similar concerns. Others, however, do not agree that obliga­
tions to pay creditors from future earnings as a condition of debt relief is involuntary servi­
tude. See Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 U CLA L. Rev. 953, 
988-89 (1981) (arguing that debtor is not working against his will insofar as he is permitted
to keep substantial portions of earnings for care of himself and his family). This skepticism
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ment is under no duty to provide a benefit in the first place, accept­
ance of the benefit does not necessarily constitute a waiver of 
constitutional protection.17° And the waiver argument would have no 
logical purchase in cases of involuntary bankruptcy or involuntary 
state law debt collection, except perhaps if one took the position that 
the act of not paying debts itself constitutes a waiver. 
In other contexts as well, forced personal service is disfavored. In 
standard contract law, courts do not require personal service contracts 
actually to be performed, even if the defaulting party entered the 
agreement under circumstances that were unambiguously voluntary. 
The most that a disappointed party can hope for is money damages, 
not a specific performance decree.171 
The same resistance to specific performance for personal service 
contracts clearly exists within the debtor-creditor system. When a 
bankruptcy case involves an individual with unique skills, questions 
about the enforceability of personal services contracts may arise.172 
Here, too, it is generally agreed that, just as a debtor cannot force a 
nondebtor party to accept another's services in lieu of his own, 173 
neither can the nondebtor obtain specific performance from the 
debtor.174 As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted, 
"[p ]ersonal services contracts differ from other executory contracts ... 
in that the consent of the parties is required before the trustee has the 
authority to assume them-a qualification which reflects the peculiar 
nature of such contracts and the widespread distaste for involuntary 
servitude. "175
might be diminished if the debtor were actually being required to provide future personal 
services rather than being required merely to submit a portion of future income. 
170 Sullivan, supra note 169, at 1460. 
171 See, e.g., Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts§ 1204 (1964) (discussing limi­
tations on specific performance). 
172 Debtors' contracts can, under some circumstances, be assumed (continued), rejected 
{breached), or assigned to a third party, even over the objection of the party who originally 
entered into the contract with the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(f) (2001). 
173 See generally David G. Epstein, Steve H. Nickles & James J. White, Bankruptcy§ 5-
15 (1993) (explaining grounds for nonassignability). 
174 See, e.g., Cloyd v. GRP Records (In re Cloyd), 238 B.R. 328, 335 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
1999) (noting that limiting trustee's ability to enforce personal services contracts is means 
of protecting debtors against involuntary servitude (citing Delightful Music v. Taylor, 913 
F.2d 102 {3d Cir. 1990))).
175 Delightful Music, 913 F.2d at 107. One court attributed the rule to the fact that
"courts have always understood that an artist does not work well under compulsion." In re 
Noonan, 17 B.R. 793, 797-98 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) {"Where an executory contract be­
tween the debtor and another is of such a nature as to be based upon the debtor's personal 
skill, the trustee does not take title to the debtor's rights and cannot deal with the con­
tract. .. . The Arista contract is simply not the kind of an asset to which the creditors can 
look by insisting that the debtor assume it."); cf. In re Carrere, 64 B.R. 156 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. 1986). Other courts, such as Cloyd, have been able to protect the debtor from forced 
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The fact that publicity rights are valuable without the celebrity's 
active cooperation, coupled with the law's dislike of coerced personal 
performances, supports our conclusion that the celebrity's future ser­
vices are not part of her publicity rights. From this, we further con­
clude that publicity rights can be incorporated into the debtor-creditor 
context ,vithout requiring violation of the principle that the debtor 
should retain control over her future labor. 
2. Does Inclusion of the Right of Publicity in a Debtor's Estate
Impose an Indirect Burden on Future Earning Capacity?
If one defines the right of publicity as purely passive in nature,
the forced sale of publicity interests should not offend the limitation 
on "property of the estate" that excludes earnings generated by 
postpetition services of the debtor.176 Bounding the property right 
this way permits a valuable res to be sold while appearing to preserve 
for the celebrity the monetary rewards of future work. 
In practice, however, it is important to ask whether the sale of 
publicity rights to the highest bidder in bankruptcy might nonetheless 
have indirect implications for the celebrity's ability to enjoy the fruits 
of her future economic endeavors. Although we believe that it does, 
we do not believe that they are of a sort that would or should render 
publicity rights ineligible for inclusion as an asset in the debtor-credi­
tor system. 
Clearly, the celebrity must refrain from exercising the right of 
publicity once it is owned by someone else so as not to negate the 
value of the asset that has been transferred.177 Even though the celeb­
rity might be tempted to enter contracts to make advertisements or 
participate in future marketing endorsements-performances that the 
purchaser cannot claim were part of the publicity interest that he pur­
chased-a celebrity could not do so without putting herself into com­
petition with the purchaser, in effect rendering her an infringer of her 
assumption without reaching the property of the estate questions central to Bofill and 
Noonan. In re Bofill, 25 B.R. 550 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (arguing that personal services 
contract is not property of estate because trustee cannot assume it and because 11 U.S.C. 
§ 541(a)(6) (2001) excludes from property of estate any future profits from such contracts).
See In re Cloyd, 238 B.R. at 335.
176 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (2001). 
177 That a celebrity who transfers a publicity right and then attempts to exploit it himself 
is an infringer has been clear from the outset. In Haelan Labs. Inc. v. Topps Chewing 
Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 870 (2d Cir. 1953), for example, the court made clear that a 
baseball player could not transfer exclusive rights to use his image on a baseball card and 
then tum around and grant exclusive rights for the same purpose to someone else. See 
also MJ & Partners Rest. Ltd. P'ship v. Zadikoff, 10 F. Supp. 2d 922, 930 (N.D. Ill. 1998) 
( considering, among other claims, whether Michael Jordan infringed right of publicity that 
he had transferred to restauranteurs). 
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own publicity right. The need for a "negative injunction" limiting the 
celebrity's future freedom of action raises two potential problems. 
First, there are likely to be areas of ambiguity as to what is and is not 
"infringing activity." Second, there will be limits on the ways in which 
the famous person can develop her career and pursue income in the 
future. 
In some instances, courts may need to decide whether a debtor's 
future activities are appropriate uses of human capital or are inappro­
priate attempts to exploit publicity rights that the celebrity no longer 
owns or controls.178 For example, a model like Cindy Crawford earns 
her livelihood wearing clothes and makeup designed by others. In 
some instances, when she shows the clothes and makeup she is pursu­
ing her primary career as a fashion model. In others, she may be ex­
hibiting herself in the clothes or makeup specifically to endorse them 
as products. Distinguishing one from the other might be difficult, but 
courts are no strangers to this kind of line-drawing; it is the mainstay 
of infringement actions,179 and the fact-sensitivity of this enterprise 
does not provide a compelling reason to refrain from treating public­
ity rights as alienable property in the bankruptcy context. The prob­
lem of celebrities infringing publicity rights that they transferred to 
others has already arisen in settings outside of bankruptcy180 and no 
doubt will continue to do so. 
The fact that a famous person who has parted with publicity 
rights will be precluded from engaging in some income-amplifying ac­
tivities is a more serious concern, but it does not necessarily mean that 
the sale of the rights will interfere illegitimately with her postpetition 
earnings. The impact of the sale on the celebrity would be quite simi­
lar to what already happens in bankruptcy when other forms of intel­
lectual property are subject to forced sale. A designer whose name is 
178 See generally, Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Are Ideas Within the Traditional Defini­
tion of Property?: A Jurisprudential Analysis, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 603, 603 (1994) ("Products 
of the mind can be simultaneously possessed and used by multiple parties, and different 
parties may even use the same product of the mind differently. In contrast, the mythical 
Blackacre cannot be simultaneously used as an airport and as a cornfield."); Ghosh, supra 
note 115, at 121 (noting that indistinct boundaries of intellectual property regimes provide 
broad protection but fuzziness creates uncertainty as to what is actually protected). 
179 In the Dustin Hoffman case, for example, the court was called upon to draw a line 
between commercial and noncommercial uses by deciding whether a fashion spread in a 
magazine was a disguised advertisement, as the plaintiff charged, or, instead, protected 
editorial matter. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184-86 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
l80 See, e.g., Zadikoff, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 930. This sort of infringement problem occurs 
in other forms of intellectual property as well. See, e.g., Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930 (2d 
Cir. 1914) (holding that photographer infringed one of his own former photographs whose 
copyright he had sold along with picture). 
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also his trademark, for example, will not be able to exploit that asset 
to sell clothes in the future once the trademark has been sold to a 
third party .181 
The celebrity whose publicity rights have been sold may actually 
be in a better position to generate future earnings from personal per­
formance than the designer in the example just given. The limitations 
on the scope of the right of publicity and the prohibitions on the fu­
ture activities by the celebrity suggest an opportunity for mutually 
beneficial cooperation. Although the celebrity could not exploit his 
publicity rights ,vithout reacquiring them, neither could the purchaser 
obtain specially posed photographs or performances or personal ap­
pearances without negotiating separately with the celebrity for such 
benefits. The parties, therefore, both stand to benefit in many in­
stances by cooperating ,vith one another in finding the most valuable 
ways of utilizing the publicity interest. 
IV 
THE ASSOCIATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF .ALIENATING 
PUBLICITY RIGHTS 
The most vigorous objections to treating publicity rights as assets 
in the debtor-creditor system are not likely to result from the "fit" of 
the publicity right into standard definitions of property or even from 
the fact that the celebrity will be divested of its economic value. 
Rather, they ,vill come from the fact that an individual, through a 
forced sale, ,vill lose control over the use of her identity if it is treated 
as a form of property.182 This is where debtor-creditor law differs 
most starkly from the taxation and divorce cases discussed in Part II: 
For the most part, those cases were about sharing value, rather than 
181 See, e.g., In re Gucci, 202 B.R. 686, 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (explaining that 
"upon the bankruptcy of the trademark owner, the trademark together with the goodwill it 
symbolizes becomes vested in the trustee in bankruptcy" and reasoning that designs cre­
ated postpetition had to belong to purchaser of trademark or court "would essentially be 
creating in Paolo the right to continue the very business the trustee sold"); see also Licens­
ing by Paolo, Inc. v. Sinatra (In re Gucci), 126 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding merits of 
sale of intellectual property unreviewable due to nonappealability of sale to good faith 
purchaser under 11 U.S.C. § 363). Trademark law distinguishes between the commercial 
use of a person's name, which cannot be continued once that asset has been transferred to 
another, and the use of the name in the individual's private capacity to identify himself, 
which may continue to be used. See McCarthy, supra note 47, § 10.11. 
132 See, e.g., Am. Sleek Craft, Inc. v. Nescher, 131 B.R. 991, 996 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1991) 
(explaining that if trade name was asset of bankrupt corporation, it had been sold to pur­
chaser); Allegheny Health, Educ. & Research Found. v. Williams (In re Allegheny Health, 
Educ. & Research Found.), 233 B.R. 671, 675 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1999) (finding no dispute 
that intellectual property, which was property of bankruptcy estate, was sold to third-party 
purchaser and now is exclusively owned by that party, not by estate or debtor); In re Gucci, 
202 B.R. at 690-91. 
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sharing control over or, worse yet, divesting control of, the publicity 
right.183 Neither the IRS nor the former spouse obtained sole author­
ity to decide how the celebrity's name, likeness, and other attributes 
were to be used in commercial settings. In the debtor-creditor con­
text, by contrast, forced sale of the asset gives to the highest bidder 
complete control over the exploitation of the right of publicity, includ­
ing the right to sue for infringement.184 Tue end result is that the 
treatment of publicity rights in the debtor-creditor system leads to ex­
actly the opposite of what was hoped for in deciding to commodify the 
interest. Tue successful bidder, not the famous person, gets to make 
the decisions about the commercial associations to be made with her 
public identity. With the right in the hands of a stranger, celebrities 
who argue for an expansive interpretation of the right may find that 
the very breadth of the right they originally desired has turned into a 
personal and professional liability. 
In Hae/an, Judge Frank thought it made sense to turn the celeb­
rity persona into property because he believed that most well-known 
people really only wanted to earn money from their fame. He did not 
think celebrities were interested in defending themselves against the 
use of their identities in commercial settings because they wanted to 
retain their personal privacy.185 Contrary to Judge Frank's expecta­
tions, however, publicity rights have never been completely severed 
from their roots in privacy, and the property-privacy tension186 is 
l83 If intellectual property interests such as copyrights are divided between spouses at
divorce, control can sometimes be an issue because the co-owners have independent power 
to divest themselves of their shares and substitute a new party into the relationship. At 
least one court has tried to avoid this problem by leaving managerial control over the 
copyrighted works at issue in the hands of the artist who created them and awarding the 
spouse only a beneficial interest in the economic returns generated by the works. Ro­
drigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2000); see also McGowan, supra note 109. 
184 See, e.g., Zadikoff, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 930 (concluding that acquirer of exclusive li­
cense to use Michael Jordan's name on Chicago restaurant had standing to sue Jordan and 
Zadikoff for infringement of right of publicity). The court noted that "much of the confu­
sion between the right of privacy and publicity has resulted from the fact that many liti­
gants choose to sue for invasion of privacy rather than for appropriation of property rights 
in situations where injury to feelings has only secondary application." Id. at 930 n.3. 
185 See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). 
See also supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
186 See Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 
Duke L.J. 383 (1999). Dean Haemmerli has argued that publicity rights have their origin 
in individual autonomy, and that, as a result, have both moral and the economic dimen­
sions. Id. Her arguments would clearly cut against the treatment of a celebrity persona as 
an economic res functionally indistinguishable from a stock certificate or an unset dia­
mond. Related arguments are made in Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality 
and Reputational Interests of Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint 
for the Twenty-First Century, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 151; Richard Masur, Right of Publicity 
From the Performer's Point of View, 10 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. & Pol'y 253 (2000); 
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clearly implicated by the prospect of placing publicity rights in the 
hands of the highest bidder as a result of debt collection or 
bankruptcy. 
In addition, not all famous people share Judge Frank's view that 
all they want from the right of publicity is the ability to earn money. 
Some object to all commercial uses. For these individuals, the ability 
to avoid exploitation of their property interest is motivated by some­
thing much more closely akin to dignitary rather than economic con­
cerns. One of the earliest decisions to ratify the publicity right as a 
defensive tool for avoiding commercial exploitation came from the 
Supreme Court of Georgia and involved an objection by the estate of 
Dr. Martin Luther King to the sale of plastic commemorative busts of 
the civil rights leader.187 Had the court been required to rely on the 
privacy tort to deal ,vith the case, it would have been unable to rule in 
favor of the estate because King's privacy interests died with him. A 
publicity right, by contrast, was a property interest and could survive. 
This gave the court a mechanism for protecting what was conceptually 
indistinguishable from a privacy right. Publicity rights, the court de­
clared, were as important a tool for those who did not want to have 
their image exploited commercially as they were for those who sought 
to extract the maximum value from their fame.188
Dr. King was not a classic celebrity, and neither he nor his survi­
vors had any reason to be concerned with developing a popular fol­
lowing for its own sake. But subsequently, several entertainers have 
taken a comparable approach, enforcing their publicity rights in a sim­
ilar negative sense to prevent all commercial uses of their identities.189 
Even celebrities who have exploited their identities for profit in 
the past may value control as much, or almost as much, as the eco­
nomic benefits from marketing themselves. To them, the issue is not 
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957 (1982); cf. Madoff, 
supra note 102 ( expressing concern with treating publicity rights as taxable part of estate 
when deceased or her heirs and legatees do not wish to exploit interest). 
187 Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 
S.E. 2d 697, 706 (Ga. 1982) ("[A] person who avoids exploitation during life is entitled to 
have his image protected against exploitation after death just as much if not more than a 
person who exploited his image during life."). 
188 Id. 
189 See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
506 U.S. 1080 (1993) (noting that Waits stated publicly that "musical artists should not do 
commercials because it detracts from their artistic integrity"); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 
849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Midler did not do television commercials."); Hoffman v. 
Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867,870 (C.D. Cal. 1999), rev'd 255 F.3d 1180 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (concluding that Dustin Hoffman's "name and likeness is an extremely valuable 
commodity and privilege not only because of Mr. Hoffman's stature as an actor, but be­
cause he does not knowingly permit commercial uses of his identity"). 
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whether to appear in commercial contexts, but rather how to retain 
control· over the circumstanc�s of their appearances. Some of their 
interest in control may simply reflect a desire to ration their exposure 
to retain its value; they do not want their fans to tire of them or de­
velop unwanted associations between the star and questionable or 
tasteless products.190 
Often, however, the control provides more than an economic 
management tool; celebrities may have personal objections to a con­
nection with a product or cause, or even to an entire category of us­
age. For example, when former Dodger pitcher Don Newcombe 
discovered a drawing of someone who strongly resembled him in an 
advertisement for Coors beer, he sued.191 Newcombe's objection to 
being associated with a beer advertisement arose not from any eco­
nomic strategy or apparent antipathy to commercials generally but 
from the fact that he was a recovering alcoholic. The Ninth Circuit, 
ruling in his favor, noted in passing that, in California, publicity law is 
available to protect both dignitary and economic interests.192 
The most fervent argument against allowing publicity rights to be 
forcibly sold, therefore, is that these interests, to an extent not 
matched by other forms of intellectual property, implicate personal 
dignity, reputational interests, and human autonomy.193 If the state 
forces individuals to relinquish control over their personas to others 
who can then connect the individual, against his will, with undesired 
( or undesirable) commercial enterprises, it arguably violates associa­
tional rights. One might go so far as to argue that these problems 
demonstrate that the human persona is wholly unsuitable to charac­
terization and treatment as a commodity194 and should not be treated 
as one in the debtor-creditor arena. 
States could, of course, adopt this view and could pass laws ex­
empting publicity rights from the debtor-creditor system. Illinois, in 
190 Sometimes, stars simply change their minds about exploiting their publicity interests 
and decide to withdraw from the commercial arena. For example, Michael Jordan recently 
announced that he no longer wants to endorse products, although he had previously made 
millions doing so. Associated Press, Jordan Wants out of Endorsements, The Columbian, 
Mar. 23, 2000, at C4. 
191 Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1998).
192 Id.; see also Brinkley v. Casablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1012 {App. Div. 1981) (stat­
ing that dignitary and economic "damages are caused by the same wrong and should be 
redressed by the same cause of action"). 
193 For these arguments, see sources cited in note 186, supra. 
194 Professor Radin has been notable in arguing against the use of markets for certain
highly valuable interests and against the trend toward commodification of the self. See 
generally Radin, supra note 186. 
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fact, has created an especially expansive exemption of this sort.195 As 
noted earlier in this Article, state and federal law can declare some 
property exempt from the reach of unsecured creditors who attempt 
to satisfy their claims from the debtors' property after the debtors 
have failed to pay. Among the several justifications for property ex­
emptions, certain forms of wealth may be seen as so intimately con­
nected to the human psyche that it would be morally offensive to 
permit creditors free reign in exploiting them after the debtor has 
failed to pay. Exemptions for items such as family photographs, wed­
ding rings, and perhaps even homesteads seem to recognize the per­
sonal and intimate relationship between these objects and the 
individual who owns them, and the undesirability of permitting credi­
tors to use the ultimate threat of loss of these objects as leverage for 
collection. By specifically identifying a type of property, like publicity 
rights, and placing it beyond the reach of creditors, states can give 
force to the judgment that it is a form of wealth, like a wedding ring, 
that is invested ,vith such delicate psychic values that it should be 
shielded from some or all creditors. 
An exemption for publicity rights would have to proceed, of 
course, from an assumption that the associational and dignitary inter­
ests at stake outweigh the benefits of treating these rights like other 
ordinary assets in the debtor-creditor system. We question whether 
such an assumption is valid. For one thing, the claimed benefits of 
allowing the celebrity to retain control over uses of her persona are 
not entirely convincing.196 Although many commentators emphasize 
the reputational, dignitary, and autonomy-protecting qualities of the 
publicity right, 197 the truth is that the right of publicity provides those 
benefits only in a very narrow sphere. In most important regards, ce­
lebrities do not control the ways in which their image is presented to 
195 See 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1075/15 (West 2002) (prohibiting security interests in, 
or levy or attachment of, publicity rights themselves but not of income earned from ex­
ploiting them). This exemption is unusually expansive because most property exemptions 
protect property against unsecured creditors, but do not prevent debtors from giving credi­
tors enforceable security interests in that property. 
196 In actual fact, when a right of publicity is transferred, the purchaser is in some senses 
at the mercy of the celebrity in a way that the purchaser of almost any other form of 
property is not. For example, advertisers who paid for the use of O.J. Simpson's name and 
face were left with considerably less than they bargained for when the former football star 
became enmeshed in a notorious murder case. Prior to being charged with the murder of 
his former wife, O.J. Simpson was a spokesperson for the auto rental giant, Hertz. He was 
dropped by the company as a result of the scandal. Patrick Saunders, Perfect Pitch: Ad­
vertisers Try to Match Products, Personalities, Denver Post, June 24, 2001, at Cl. 
197 The importance of the reputational interest in how publicity rights are exploited is 
discussed in Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 Ind. L.J. 1, 37-45 (1997); Kwall, supra note 
186; Masur, supra note 186. See also Haemmerli, supra note 186. 
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the public, and attempts to exercise such control would violate the 
First Amendment rights of others. Newsworthy uses of celebrity per­
sonas, even highly unflattering ones, are virtually never subject to a 
celebrity's property right.198 Furthermore, the very concept of aliena­
bility means that the law contemplates the real possibility that celebri­
ties will assign all or part of the right to use their personas to others­
at which point they necessarily give up, albeit voluntarily, any legal 
right to object to how the assignee uses their identities in the future.199
It is also important to add that forced sale of publicity rights does 
not strip the debtor of legal remedies against egregious misuses of her 
identity. For example, the celebrity would retain the right to sue for 
defamation and to complain of unfair trade practices under either the 
Lanham Act or state law.20° Creators of other kinds of intellectual 
l98 See McCarthy, supra note 47, § 8:56 ("A celebrity cannot use the right of publicity to
claim a 'property right' in his or her likeness, as reflected in photos taken in a public place 
and used to illustrate a newsworthy story."); see e.g., 'lime, Inc. v. Sand Creek Partners, 
825 F. Supp. 210, 213 (S.D. Ind. 1993) (finding that newsworthiness of celebrity wedding 
photos "has primacy over any privacy rights"). But see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. 
Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding that newsworthiness is not First Amendment defense 
where performer's entire act is taken). 
199 In a voluntary alienation, the celebrity has the opportunity to select the new owner 
of the rights and can choose based on past experience, trust, and affirmative representa­
tions memorialized in the contract for sale. Yet, even voluntary transactions can substan­
tially sour. An example that illustrates this point can be found in the history of a recording 
industry deal between the musician Prince and Warner Bros. Although the arrangement 
was entered into consensually, Prince quickly became dissatisfied with the way in which 
Warner Bros. exercised control. For example, Prince opposed the rerelease of one of his 
early songs, "1999," saying on his website that "(t]he release . . .  most benefits the owner of 
the master recording (not the artist and creator of the work, [The Artist Formerly Known 
as Prince])." See Rob Brunner, Partying Shot, Ent. Wkly., Dec. 4, 1998, at 14. Absent the 
ability to supersede Warner Bros.'s decisions legally, Prince apparently exercised his lever­
age and dissatisfaction in a different way by producing substandard albums, by changing 
his name to an unpronounceable symbol and by having the word "slave" written on his 
face when he appeared in videos. Will Lee, Sign O' the 'lime; His Royal Purpleness, 
Prince, Changed His Name to [Symbol for the Artist Formerly Known as Prince], June 7, 
1993, Ent. Wkly., June 4, 1999, at 98; Richard Torres, Breaking Free, Gloriously, Newsday, 
Dec. 15, 1998, at COO; Jim Farber, Sour Deal Fmally Ends in 'Chaos'; Artist Formerly 
Known for Inspired Work Releases His Worst Album Ever, Daily News, July 16, 1996, at 
37; Mark Scheerer, Donald Van de Mark & Beverly Schuch, The Artist Formerly Known 
as Prince, Biz Buzz, CNNFN, July 30, 1997, Transcript #97073007FN-L04. 
zoo See, e.g., Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 348-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) 
(although toys based on characters of Dr. Seuss were made pursuant to license from copy­
right owner, Geisel (Seuss's real name)-despite having no copyright interest in relevant 
work-was permitted to raise Lanham Act § 43(a) claim, and hang tags on toys were 
changed to eliminate any suggestion that they were endorsed or approved by Seuss). If the 
name or image of the celebrity were to be used in a way that suggests, falsely, that the 
individual personally endorses a particular product or service, this too might be remediable 
under § 43(a). Professor McCarthy argues that a celebrity might also be able to use a 
privacy theory to sue for unwanted commercial uses of her identity even after transferring 
her publicity rights. McCarthy, supra note 47, § 4.13. Were this the case, however, it would 
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property have used these remedies to protect their personal interests 
after their economic interests in their creations have been transferred 
to others.201 While they are not perfect tools, they are significant 
ones. 
The claims of forced association are also questionable grounds 
for an exemr-tion. In the first place, the scope of associational rights 
under the Constitution is not very well defi.ned,202 and the likelihood 
that the First Amendment protects what arguably are mostly eco­
nomic activities and interests is particularly uncertain.203 Second, 
much of what motivates the desire not to associate with commercial 
enterprises appears to reflect personal taste rather than issues of con­
stitutional stature, such as deep-seated belief systems, political affilia­
tions, or concern \vith social causes. To the extent that the 
objectionable association is serious enough to cause a celebrity objec­
tive harm-for example, reputational injury-the law offers, as we 
have already noted, alternative forms of redress.204
We also believe that states should not categorically place public­
ity rights beyond the reach of creditors for other reasons, including 
the message that such an exemption might convey. As previously 
noted, proponents of bankruptcy reform often use celebrity bankrupt­
cies to justify a significant overhaul of the system.205 Just as unlimited 
negate the purpose of making publicity rights alienable. Licensees and assignees would be 
held hostage to the risk of a privacy action whenever the celebrity disliked the use made of 
her persona, largely gutting the value the right might have to a transferee. For a discussion 
of the possibility that false light claims might also be an alternative route to controlling 
commercial uses, see Walter A. Effross, Seamless Seaminess?: Fake Nudes "Crop" Up 
On-Line, Computer L. Strategist (Dec. 1998). 
201 Some advocates of publicity rights argue that other bodies of law such as defamation 
and the Lanham Act do not give sufficient protection to celebrities. See, e.g., Kwall, supra 
note 197, at 37-38. The sufficiency of the protection may depend, for example, on whether 
or not one believes that publicity rights are so important that their owners should not have 
to meet the constitutional tests imposed in ordinary libel litigation or meet the require­
ments of the Lanham Act that the plaintiff show misrepresentation to prevail. That is not 
the view of the authors of this Article. 
202 Although described as a Frrst Amendment right, freedom of association is not actu­
ally mentioned in the Constitution. Its existence is clearest as a protection against govern­
ment attempts to interfere with the ability of individuals to associate for political purposes. 
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (finding that requiring civil rights or­
ganization to disclose its membership violates associational rights); Watkins v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (holding that legislative investigation into political association 
violates associational rights). Even here, however, its scope is somewhat uncertain. See, 
e.g., Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1
(1961) (upholding legislative requirement that Communist Party register and disclose its
membership).
203 See, e.g., Lyng v. Int'l Union, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (upholding law making households 
of striking workers ineligible for food stamps). 
204 See supra text accompanying notes 200-01. 
205 See Miller, supra note 45; Seelye, supra note 45. 
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homestead exemptions-which helped debtors like Burt Reynolds 
shelter significant wealth while failing to pay his creditors in full-are 
now coming under attack, a special exemption for publicity rights 
would be similarly vulnerable to accusations that they are a form of 
favoritism toward the wealthy and well-advised. 
In addition to sending a questionable message to the public about 
privilege for the privileged, it would be anomalous in other regards to 
exempt publicity rights from the category of property reachable by 
creditors. First of all, as the discussion of creditors' rights earlier in 
this article points out,206 the overall philosophy of our current debtor­
creditor system puts the interests of the creditor in forcing the sale of 
the debtor's assets-publicity rights or otherwise-ahead of the pref­
erences of the delinquent debtor. 
Second, particularly where the owner of publicity rights volunta­
rily avails himself of the extraordinary relief provided by chapter 7 
bankruptcy, one could reason that the filing implies consent to the sale 
of any or all of his valuable assets, including the value of his persona, 
as a fair quid pro quo.207 Others have used this sort of reasoning to 
justify the liquidation of other kinds of intellectual property similarly 
invested with aspects of the individual's personality and dignitary in­
terests.208 For example, a bankrupt author can be forced to transfer
her rights in her copyrights to her published and unpublished works, 
however much a part of her personhood she may deem them.209 An
individual who is closely and personally identified with a trademark­
for example, someone whose name is the mark in question-may lose 
ownership of that quite personal form of intellectual property, if it is 
associated with a business that is sold in an insolvency proceeding. He 
would then face the prospect that subsequent works produced under 
his name might be, from his perspective, of poorer design or otherwise 
unrepresentative of the originator's style, desires, or preferences. 
This loss of control typically attends the voluntary transfer of 
rights in copyrights and other forms of intellectual property. If an au­
thor sells her publisher the copyright in her tragic novel, she cannot 
206 See supra text accompanying notes 112-18. 
207 The argument that participation in bankruptcy, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, 
implies consent to the transfer of one's property has been proffered as an explanation for 
why the federal copyright law, 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2001), makes an exception for bank­
ruptcy in its overall prohibition against involuntary transfers of copyrights. See Martin & 
Smith, supra note 116, at 93. 
208 Martin & Smith, supra note 116, at 93. 
209 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2001). Under the 1976 Copyright Act, all works are covered by 
statutory copyright as soon as they are fixed in tangible form; the law makes no distinction 
between works that are published and ones that are unpublished. Section 201(e) refers 
generically to "copyrights" and therefore presumably applies to unpublished manuscripts. 
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object if the purchaser later decides to turn it into a musical comedy, 
however strong the emotional and identity links between the creator 
and the purity of her creation. Many authors have lobbied for a legal 
right to exercise continuing control over how their works are used 
even after the transfer of their economic interest in their copyrights­
a type of protection that is available under the continental European 
system of moral rights210-but the United States has been extremely 
reluctant to adopt such an approach.211 
If legislators remain uncomfortable about the idea of forced sales 
of an interest like publicity, a possible middle ground might be to limit 
forced sales in bankruptcy to the publicity interests only of those who 
had been exploiting them prior to bankruptcy. This compromise 
would respect the fundamental choice of the individual about whether 
or not to engage in commercial exploitation of the self, or instead to 
choose greater privacy, as well as any possible reputational benefits 
that might flow from being known as someone who shuns 
commerciality. 
At least two problems ,vith this approach seem evident to us, 
however. First, the line drawn is a questionable one. It is not clear, 
for example, that the interest in control really is stronger in the case of 
someone who never makes advertisements than, for example, of 
someone like Don Newcombe, who might feel comfortable about en­
dorsing sneakers but would loathe the idea of appearing in a commer­
cial for beer.212 Second, the distinction would risk abuse. In most 
circumstances, publicity rights exist as a legal interest whether or not 
the individual ever chooses to exploit them. Therefore, unless the 
holder of an unexploited right could be barred from changing her 
mind in the future, creditors could see their access to a potentially 
210 Moral rights are explained in Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral 
Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1985). 
211 The one exception in copyright law is the so-called Visual Artists Rights Act, a re­
cent addition to the statute which creates limited moral rights in some creators of artworks. 
17 U.S.C. § 106A (2001). Generally, however, American law (in contrast to continental 
European law) has chosen not to view authors as entitled to control over use of their work 
once ownership of the copyright has been given up. Sometimes, however, the creators 
successfully enforce their preferences even in the absence of an evident legal claim. For 
example, the remaining Beatles expressed distress at the use of their song "Revolution" in 
a Nike advertisement, although Nike acquired the right to use the song from the song's 
legal "owner." See Janice Kalmar, Nike Vows to Continue Using Beatles Song in Ads, 
United Press Int'l, Aug. 4, 1987. As a result, when Volkswagen wanted to use Beatles 
music in advertisements for the reintroduced Beetle, Volkswagen sought permission of the 
Beatles's management company in addition to the owner of the songs. Graham Bowley & 
Alice Rawsthom, Beetles want Beatles, If VW Can Afford It, Fm. Times, Feb. 5, 1998, at 
25. 
212 See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text. 
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valuable asset evaporate, only to witness its full exploitation by the 
debtor subsequent to her discharge. 
Another possible compromise that would respect the interests of 
the celebrity but nonetheless leave something on the table for credi­
tors might be to sever the economic interest in publicity rights from 
control over how they are exploited. A creditor could benefit from 
the stream of future income from the exploitation of the property in­
terest but the celebrity or her consensual assigns would retain control 
over how the interest is exploited. An approach similar to this was 
taken recently in a Fifth Circuit case involving copyrights.213 The wife 
of a painter argued that under Louisiana community property law, she 
was entitled upon divorce to share in the ownership of the copyrights 
in those of her husband's art works created during the period of their 
marriage. She also claimed an ownership interest in later works that 
were derivative of those paintings. The court agreed that Ms. 
Rodrigue was entitled to share the copyrights. But instead of tradi­
tional co-ownership, the court left managerial control over the paint­
ings with the husband and gave Ms. Rodrigue rights only to share in 
the economic value that flowed from them.214 This approach finds 
some analogy in the state law wage garnishment process as well.215 
A division of rights along these lines may have much to recom­
mend it where both parties continue to have an economic stake in 
how the work is exploited. In the Rodrigue case, the fact that the ex­
husband will benefit as much as his ex-wife from sound management 
of the intellectual property creates some assurance that he will act in 
ways that will also protect the beneficial owner's interests. But in 
bankruptcy, the sale would mean severing control from the right to 
benefit, and would provide no such assurances.216 In fact, it sets up 
serious negative incentives, comparable, as discussed earlier, to those 
that would flow from making the future income from a debtor's 
postpetition services subject to creditors' claims.217 A celebrity would 
213 Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2000). 
214 Id. One of the rights provided to owners of copyrights is control over the making of 
derivative works. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2001). A derivative work is one that reuses expres­
sion from a prior copyrighted work. 
215 See generally, Coleman, supra note 113, at 212; Cecilia M. Martaus, Garnishment of 
Employee Wages in Ohio: Whose Money Is It Anyway?, 18 Ohio N.U. L. Rev.197 (1991). 
216 In other parts of the debtor-creditor system, however, where garnishment of rights to 
payment is an alternative method of satisfying creditor claims, it might be possible to cre­
ate a parallel to Rodrigue by garnishing a portion of incoming payments stemming from 
licensed uses of the debtor's right of publicity. 
217 For a discussion of the rule in bankruptcy about income from future services, see 
supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text. 
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have little impetus to nurture and develop an interest, the economic 
benefits from which would flow entirely to someone else. 
Finally, we must note an option that already exists to preserve a 
debtor's control over assets. At least in the bankruptcy context, the 
debtor usually has the alternative of satisfying creditors out of a re­
payment plan ( and retaining ownership and control over her assets) 
rather than out of the liquidation of her assets. Because these options, 
found in chapters 11 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, require that the 
debtor pay at least what her creditors would have received had she 
liquidated her assets in chapter 7, this option becomes significantly 
more expensive and risky for celebrities if publicity rights are recog­
nized as assets. Thus, control may be available even in the debtor­
creditor context, but the debtor must purchase it, and at a potentially 
steep price. 
For those reasons, we adhere to our view that the interest should 
be treated as property of the estate, ,vithout limitations and without 
exemptions, even recognizing that this treatment will likely offend 
those who othenvise favor the recognition of property rights in iden­
tity. Again, echoing the court in Piscopo,218 the question is whether it 
is reasonable and fair to create a form of property that is legally cogni­
zable only when it favors the famous or their assigns, but not when the 
benefits of doing so would flow to ex-spouses, taxing authorities, or 
people to whom a celebrity owes money. 
CONCLUSION 
The commodification of fame has allowed celebrities to tap into 
new sources of wealth and exercise control over uses of the valuable 
identities they helped to create. But, in counting the gains, celebrities 
and advocates of expansive property rights in identity may not have 
taken into account the loss of control that commodification may bring. 
This Article has examined commodified fame in the context of the 
debtor-creditor system and has shown that the right of publicity has 
the formal attributes that make it suitable for creditors to reach in 
satisfaction of delinquent debts. The identification and seizure of 
alienable property interests have long been central to the debtor-cred­
itor system. Valuable intangible property interests, although more dif­
ficult to "seize" per se, are no exception. Thus, as a consequence of 
filing a bankruptcy petition or otherwise being a debtor in the debtor­
creditor system, the celebrity may be forced to part with her interest 
in controlling and exploiting the value of her identity in advertising 
and a broad range of other "commercial" settings. To the extent that 
21s 555 A.2d 1190, 1192 (NJ. Ch. 1988). 
1368 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:1322 
the forced sale of commodified fame presents either practical or asso­
ciational and dignitary concerns, we believe they are not analytically 
different from those that arise when other kinds of intellectual prop­
erty that have long been available to satisfy unpaid debts are at issue. 
The sale of publicity rights does not implicate interests of an apprecia­
bly different magnitude than, for example, divesting an author of her 
copyrights. 
Even if one were to disagree with this assessment, however, it is 
nevertheless important to recognize that there are consequences of 
the basic decision to treat fame as a commodity, and that these conse­
quences up until now have largely been ignored. If those conse­
quences are unacceptable, then change should come in the form of an 
alteration in the legal characterization of the right rather than through 
tweaking property exemption schemes or compromising creditors' 
rights in the debtor-creditor system. But if the choice we make is to 
continue to opt for commodification, then personas, like yachts, 
should be "properties for all seasons." 
